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Introduction 
Throughout history, one of the most important aspects of international law has been 
sovereignty. In the 20
th
 century a new term has been added to the equation – human rights. 
However, there is often a conflict between these two concepts because sometimes human 
rights have to be protected in a way that infringes on the State’s sovereignty. This has given 
rise to discussions about the legality of doctrines which restrict the sovereignty of States such 
as the protecting nationals abroad doctrine.   
The relevance of this topic becomes clear when considering the fact that nowadays, most 
States are relatively restricted when it comes to the independent use of force. In order to act in 
a legal way, it is important to understand international rules. What is more, to keep universal 
peace and security it is necessary to reinforce the valid international rules at place. However, 
when dealing with international law, this can prove to be complicated due to the fact that 
these rules are constantly changing. Among other things, technical advancement, changes in 
international political attitudes and state practice have an impact on international treaty and 
customary law.  
Throughout the coexistence of the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad with the United 
Nations (UN) Charter, scholars and States have never agreed upon its applicability, limits and 
compatibility with the Charter. The idea behind the doctrine is that a State has the right to 
protect all persons of its nationality, even though they might be situated in another State’s 
territory and so, States claim to have an excuse to intervene with the latter’s territorial 
integrity, i.e. sovereignty.  
The Russian Federation is one of the most powerful States in the world, having one of the five 
permanent seats in the UN Security Council and being the largest territorial State in the world. 
Therefore, it has a potentially huge impact on the development of international law. What is 
more, from what can be determined from its behavior it seems Russia also has aspirations to 
shape the interpretation of international law in a way that is advantageous to Moscow. This 
however, does not mean that Russia enjoys the right to ignore established rules.  
Russia’s actions in Crimea since the beginning of the year 2014 can be seen as one of the 
biggest threats to peace in Europe since the Cold War. These recent events have brought 
attention to the principle of protecting nationals abroad and the application of said doctrine. 
Moscow’s rhetoric has been that it was rescuing its nationals who were threatened and at risk 
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outside of Russia and claimed that this was sufficient justification for taking military action 
against Ukraine and deploying forces in Crimea.  
This thesis will examine whether these events might have been cause to a change in the 
legality of the doctrine. The hypothesis is submitted that since the Russian intervention for the 
protection of its nationals in Crimea was prima facie not in accordance with the rules and 
limitations of the doctrine, there has been no change.  
It is important to understand whether and how Russia has violated the rules of international 
law. If rules have been broken, a clear comprehension is necessary to find a long-term 
solution to the crisis. What is more, it can help prevent future analogous conflicts; and 
regrettably, analogous conflicts are not out of the question. Concerns about expansionist 
aggression of Moscow have also been expressed in Estonia and other States that share a 
border with Russia.   
Having said that, if there is a clear consensus about the rules of the protecting nationals 
abroad doctrine, Western Countries, and hopefully others as well, will be able to react faster 
and more assertively. An understanding of the legality of Russian policy and strategies will 
make it possible for the international community to stand up for less powerful States’ rights 
that are under attack and to stay undivided while securing international peace.  
The aim of this research paper is to examine the legality of the protecting nationals abroad 
doctrine. In order to do so, first an overview of different legal justifications for the use of 
force in international law will be given. Here, for the most part the works of C. D. Gray
1
 and 
M. E. O’Connell2 will be examined. Additionally, some relevant International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) cases and the Commentary of the United Nations Charter
3
 will be studied.  
Thereafter a more close analysis of the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad will be 
conveyed. Both the theory as well as most notable invocations of the doctrine will be 
examined. Within the framework of this thesis, the author will concentrate solely on the ius 
ad bellum part of the law. This means, the humanitarian law aspects of the Crimean Crisis or 
any other case will not be discussed, only the question about when a State has the right to 
intervene in another State’s territory.  
                                                 
1
 C. D. Gray. International Law and the Use of Force. 3
rd
 edition. New York: Oxford University Press 2008. 
2
 M. E. O’Connell. Peace and War. B. Fassbender, A. Peters (editors). The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. 
3
 B. Simma, A. Randelzhofer (editors). The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary. Volume I. 2
nd
 
edition. New York: Oxford University Press 2002.  
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During the analysis of the theory, most frequently works of the following legal scholars will 
be cited: D. W. Bowett,
4
 I. Brownlie
5
 and A. Cassese
6
. The study of the state practice will 
primarily be based on several UN Security Council and General Assembly documents, and 
additionally works of the following authors were referred to: M. Akehurst,
7
 M. D. Evans,
8
 N. 
Ronzitti,
9
 T. C. Wingfield and J. E. Meyen,
10
 and J. R. Dugard
11
.   
Following the chapter about the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad, a relatively new 
doctrine will be introduced – non-combatant evacuation operations. This is necessary because 
some scholars have come to the conclusion that the old doctrine has lost its importance and 
this new doctrine has replaced it. Due to the fact that the doctrine of non-combatant 
evacuation operations only emerged in the nineties, there is little literature about this topic and 
state practice is limited. Primarily the works of A. W. R. Thomson
12
 and T. Ruys
13
 will be 
analyzed. What is more, a number of military publications will be used to get an overview of 
how States have regulated non-combatant evacuation operations in their national legislation. 
Subsequently it will be examined whether there is enough evidence to determine if the 
doctrine of protecting nationals abroad has changed after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and 
if so, how and what the doctrine’s new limitations are. First, a short introduction into the 
historical background and some of the most important details of the Crimean Crisis will be 
given. Next, the international community’s reaction to Russia’s intervention will be given. In 
addition, an attempt at trying to analyze the possible opinio iuris of the Russian Federation 
will be made.  
It should be taken into account that the information regarding the crisis is ambiguous, often 
one-sided and sometimes contradicting. Nevertheless, the author will try her best to give an 
objective evaluation of the situation. It should also be considered that while writing this thesis 
                                                 
4
 D. W. Bowett. Self-defence in International Law. Great Britain: Manchester University Press 1958. 
5
 I. Brownlie. International Law and the Use of Force by States. New York: Oxford University Press 1963. 
6
 A. Cassese (editor). The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1986.  
7
 M. Akehurst. The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad. – International Relations 1977, volume 5 
8
 M. D. Evans (editor). International Law. 3
rd
 edition. New York: Oxford University Press 2010. 
9
 N. Ronzitti. Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity. 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985 
10
 T. C. Wingfield, J. E. Meyen (editors). Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad. International 
Law Studies. Vol 77. Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College 2002 
11
 J. R. Dugard. Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection. First Report on Diplomatic Protection. 
International Law Commission. UN Doc. A/CN.4/506. 07.03.2000.  
12
 A. W. R. Thomson. Doctrine of the Protection of Nationals Abroad: Rise of the Non-Combatant Evacuation 
Operation. – Washington University Global Studies Law Review 2012, volume 11, issue 3.  
13
 T. Ruys. The ‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited. – Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2008, volume 
13 number 2.  
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the author is limited to the information made public until the spring of 2015. Within this 
chapter, mostly reports by different news outlets and press releases about the Crimean Crisis 
and Security Council meetings are referred to.  
Finally, with a look into the future, the potential lex ferenda will be analyzed. After coming to 
a conclusion about the legality of the use of force for the protection of nationals, the author 
will suggest possible solutions to the current dissension about the doctrine. The analyzed state 
practice, positions of States and legal scholars will be taken into account.  
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1. Legal Justifications for the Use of Force in the 
Modern Law 
One of the most known rules in international law is the prohibition of the use of force. This is 
true even though it is not a particularly old rule – it came about in the beginning of the 20th 
century,
14
 as a reaction to the atrocities of war, especially the world wars, development of 
modern weaponry, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
15
 During this time, 
preventing war became the main task of international politics.
16
  
The international agreements that signify the start of setting limits to the use of force were the 
Hague conventions.
17
 The signatories of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes (Hague I) of 1899 agreed to “use their best efforts to insure the pacific 
settlement of international differences” and created the Permanent Court of Arbitration to 
which parties committed to appeal to before turning to arms.
18
 Article 1 of the Convention 
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities (Hague Convention III) of 1907 Stated the obligation to 
previously explicitly warn the State before commencing to war.
19
  
Arguably the most significant change derived from the Convention Respecting the Limitation 
of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts (Hague II) of 1907. In this, 
parties agreed “not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed 
from the Government of one country by the Government of another country as being due to 
its nationals”.20 Additionally, the League of Nations Covenant tried to restrict the use of force 
in international law with the help of Article 10 which prohibited States to resort to force in 
any other case than in self-defence. However, Article 15(7) contradicted Article 10
21
 and so, 
the Covenant mainly managed to establish an obligatory cooling-off-period, not a prohibition 
of the use of force per se.
22
  
                                                 
14
 H. Wehberg, Krieg und Eroberung Im Wandel des Völkerrechts. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Alfred Metzner 
Verlag 1953. Pp 21-28.  
15
 B. Simma, A. Randelzhofer. P 114.  
16
 B. Simma, A. Randelzhofer. P 114.  
17
 B. Simma, A. Randelzhofer. P 115.  
18
 The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 (1899 Hague I). Adopted 
29.07.1899. Legal citation: 1 Bevans 230; 1 AJIL 103 (1907). Articles 1 and 20.  
19
 The Hague Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities (1907 Hague III). Adopted 18.10.1907. Legal 
citation: 205 CTS 264; 1 Bevans 619. Article 1.  
20
 The Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts 
(1907 Hague II). Adopted 18.10.1907. Legal citation: 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607. Article 1.  
21
 M. E. O’Connell. P 287.  
22
 The Covenant of the League of Nations. Adopted 28.06.1919. Legal citation: 225 Parry 195; 1 Hudson 1; 112 
BFSP 13; 13 AJIL Supp. 128 (1919). Articles 10-15.  
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The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, also known as the Kellogg-Briand-Pact or 
the Pact of Paris, of 1928 was a turning point in international law.
23
 In it the Signatory States 
agreed not to “recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, 
as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another” and to settle “all 
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise 
among them” peacefully.24 The idea behind it was to try to prevent future wars, particularly 
another world war, by only permitting war as means for self-defence. Regrettably, it failed in 
that objective, even though its provisions became customary international law.
25
 
Still, the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand-Pact served as examples for the 
United Nations when, after the Second World War, it took upon itself the responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security.
26
 The United Nations Charter was signed on 26 
June 1945 in San Francisco and entered into force on 24 October 1945.
27
 Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, which constitutes the basis of any discussion of the use of force in modern 
international law,
28
 states the following: „All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.“29 
                                                 
23
 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928. Milestones: 1921-1936. U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. 
Sine loco. Sine anno. 
24
 Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument 
of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact). Adopted 27.08.1928. Legal citation: 94 LNTS 57. Articles 1 and 2.  
25
 B. Simma, A. Randelzhofer. P 116; I. Brownlie. 1963. P 110.  
26
 I. Brownlie. Principles of Public International Law. 6
th
 edition. New York: Oxford University Press 2003. P 
698; M. E. O’Connell. P 287.  
27
 Charter of the United Nations. Introductory Note.  
28
 B. Simma, A. Randelzhofer. P 116. An interesting development that happened after the adoption of the 
Charter was that the word “war” was used considerably less and even war ministries were rebranded as defence 
ministries. See: M. E. O’Connell. P 290. 
29
 According to Article 1 of the Charter, the Purposes of the United Nations are:  
1) to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other reaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of 
the peace;  
2) to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;  
3) to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and  
4) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. 
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This norm, described by C. H. M. Waldock as the “corner stone of peace in the Charter,”30 is 
intended to contain the widest possible prohibition on the use of force. It became a part of 
customary international law
31
 as well as a ius cogens norm
32
 and is therefore also binding to 
States that have not joined the UN. This is an absolute norm that has to be respected in all 
circumstances, including the cases in which there are circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
or a treaty that conflicts with it.
33
 It is important to notice that the norm prohibits not only the 
use of force, but also the threat of force.  
However, just as tends to be the case, the general rule has exceptions. The two generally 
accepted exceptions are provided for in the Charter itself: actions authorized by the UN 
Security Council deriving from Article 42 and self-defence according to Article 51.
34
 
Additionally, the kind of use of force that does not violate the rules set out in Article 2(4) is 
permitted. This includes the use of political or economic force, because only the use of 
military force is prohibited,
35
 or use of force nationally as opposed to internationally.  
Chapter VII contains the right to take collective security enforcement measures that need to 
be administered by the Security Council. According to Article 24, Member States have trusted 
the Security Council with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. If the Council identifies a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression, it can use several measures to solve the problem. It can use provisional measures 
(Article 40), non-military measures (Article 41) or resort to military measures (Article 42). 
Subsequently, Member States have an obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council under Articles 25, 48 and 49.
36
  
                                                 
30
 C. H. M. Waldock. The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law. – Collected 
Courses. Volume 81. 1952-II. Hague Academy of International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1952. P 492.  
31
 I. Brownlie. 1963.  P 113; A. Cassese. International Law. 2
nd
 edition. New York: Oxford University Press 
2005. P 59.  
32
 N. Schrijver. Challenges to the Prohibition to Use Force. In: N. Blokker, N. Schrijver, (editors). The Security 
Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality – A Need for Change? Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2005. P 41.  
33
 J. R. Fox. Dictionary of International & Comparative Law. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications. 1992. P 239; 
See also: Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
34
 There used to be an additional “transitional” exception to the prohibition of the use of force that has since 
become obsolete. This exception was provided for in Article 107 of the UN Charter and concerned possible 
actions against the so-called enemy States.  
35
 Although there was an amendment proposed by Brazil at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, to also 
include the prohibition of threat or use of economic measures, but this suggestion was rejected; See: L. L. Sunga. 
The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and Implementation. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997. P 70.  
36
 H. Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems. With 
Supplement. 7
th
 printing. Union, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange 2008. Pp 95-98.  
11 
 
Here, it is important to note that the Security Council consists of 15 Members, 5 of which are 
permanent and have veto rights. These are the United States of America (USA), the United 
Kingdom (UK), France, Russia and China. Because of the opposing views of these States on 
many matters, the Security Council is often dead-locked and therefore inefficient.
37
  
According to Article 51, States have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. 
The use of the word “inherent” means the right to self-defence is inalienable. In order to 
determine whether use of force is justified, several factors need to be taken into account. 
Firstly, the provision limits the right so that the State may exercise self-defence solely for the 
purpose of self-defence, i.e. armed force can only be used in the case when an armed attack 
occurs. The beginning of Article 51 of the UN Charter stipulates: “Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations /---/.” 
In order to determine whether an armed attack against a State exists, Resolution 3314 that set 
out to define aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly could be examined. Articles 1 
and 3 of the resolution State inter alia: “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State /---/. 
Any of the following acts /---/ shall /---/ qualify as an act of aggression:  
1) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or 
any military occupation /---/ or any annexation /---/;  
2) the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State /---/; 
3) the use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State 
with the agreement of the receiving State in contravention of the conditions provided 
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement /---/;  
4) the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State /---/.
38
 
Additionally, the International Court of Justice has emphasized the need to distinguish 
between the most grave forms of the use of force that constitute an armed attack from less 
                                                 
37
 P. Webb. Deadlock or Restraint? The Security Council Veto and the Use of Force in Syria. – Journal of 
Conflicht & Security Law 2014, volume 19(3).  
38
 Definition of Aggression. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14.12.1974. Document 
symbol: A/RES/3314. Articles 1 and 3.  
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grave forms of the use of force that do not constitute an armed attack in the meaning of 
Article 51 and as understood in international customary law on the use of force.
39
  
The practice of the ICJ and the opinions of many authors have been in support of the position 
that an attack has to be attributable to a State for it to be considered an armed attack in the 
meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the UN.
40
 However, nowadays this view has been 
changing due to an ever growing variety of actors that are able and willing to carry out attacks 
against States. Thus, attacks from non-State actors may also considered as enough to 
constitute an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51.41  
Furthermore, in some separate opinions of ICJ cases authors have recognized the right of self-
defence against non-State actors if the attack amounts to a large-scale attack against the 
State.
42
 For example, the USA exercised the right of self-defence in Afghanistan against the 
Taliban after the actions on September 11
th
. Members of the North-Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance accepted that 
the attacks of September 11
th
 constituted an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. The principle has also been approved by the Security Council.
43
 
Article 51 further reads: “/---/ Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council /---/.” 
This means the State relying on Article 51 has the obligation to report to the Security Council. 
This, however, is often forgotten about, either on purpose or accidentally. Nevertheless, the 
absence of reports of armed activities does not stipulate a violation which would exclude the 
                                                 
39
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits. 
Judgement. ICJ. Reports 1986, p.14. Para 191; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of 
America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, p 161. Para 51.  
40
 Military and Paramilitary Activities. Paras 131, 195, 229-230; Oil Platforms. Para 51.  
41
 In support of this view: E. Wilmshurst, F. Berman, et al. The Chatham House Principles of International Law 
on the Use of Force in Self-Defence Source – The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2006, volume 
55, number 4. Pp 969-971; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins. ICJ Reports 2004, p 207. Para 33; However, for an opposing view, 
see for example: D. W. Bowett. The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad. In: A. Cassese. 1986. P 
43.  
42
 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2005, p 168. Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, ICJ Reports 2005, p 306. P 314;  
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2005, p 168. Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, ICJ Reports 2005, p 334.  P 336; For similar 
Statements, see also: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
Declaration of Judge Buergenthal. ICJ Reports 2004, p 240; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans. ICJ Reports 2004, p 219. Para 35. 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall. Declaration of Judge Buergenthal.  
43
 D. Bethlehem. Notes and Comments. Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense 
Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonsatate Actors. – The American Journal of International 
Law 2012, volume 106:000. P 3.  
13 
 
claim for self-defence.
44
 Even so, a failure to report could weaken the intervening State’s 
legal case that the reason for taking action was indeed self-defence.
45
  
Additionally, three crucial prerequisites apply: imminence, necessity and proportionality. 
These requirements, also called the Webster formula, are often linked to the 1837 Caroline 
incident
46
 and have become international customary law.
47
 Necessity is interpreted as self-
defence being the last resort after all peaceful measures have failed.
48
 Proportionality relates 
to the size, duration and target of the response and the questions of necessity and 
proportionality are dependent on the facts of the particular case.
49
 
What is more, there have been invocations of the responsibility to protect, pro-democratic 
interventions, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions as justifications to use 
force. These doctrines will, however, not be further analyzed in this thesis.  
 
  
                                                 
44
 Military and Paramilitary Activities. Para 235. 
45
 R. Higgins. The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations. 
London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press 1963. P 207; Y. Dinstein. War, Aggression and Self-
Defence. 5
th
 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012. Pp 188, 267, 272.   
46
 Named after the Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who declared that self-defence is allowed if there is “a 
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming [threat], leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation.“ Letter of Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Special Minister Ashburton, dated 27 July 1842. 
See also: R. Y. Jennings. The Caroline and McLeod Cases. – American Journal of International Law 1938, 
volume 32, number 1. P 89; C. D. Gray. P 148.  
47
 J. O'Brien. International law. London: Cavendish Publishing Limited 2001. P 682 
48
 J. Gardam. Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2004. P 5.  
49
 C. D. Gray. Pp 150-151.  
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2. The Doctrine of Protecting Nationals Abroad 
2.1. Theory 
The problem with defining the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad lies with the fact that 
no multilateral treaty regulates the protection of nationals abroad doctrine expressis verbis and 
with its complicated history. Generally, it can be said that States refer to the doctrine in cases 
where the State’s nationals are in need of protection within the boundaries of another State, 
especially where the host State is either unwilling or unable to offer the nationals the needed 
protection.  
However, this doctrine has also been used as justification to protect the property of nationals 
that is situated in another State. One of the first, albeit controversial, cases of use of force to 
protect nationals abroad that is discussed in literature is an example of this. In the case of Don 
Pacifico in 1850, Great Britain laid an embargo on all Greek merchant vessels as reaction to 
the Greek Government denying compensation to the British citizen for the loss he suffered 
during a riot.
50
  
In some cases, the application of the doctrine has also lead to long-term intervention in the 
host State to reestablish order and an environment that is secure for the nationals of the 
intervening State. This has said to be the case for example in the incidents of American 
interventions into Grenada in 1983 and into Panama in 1989.
51
  
What is more, in some cases States have invoked the doctrine in order to rescue the nationals 
of a third State, albeit usually along with the nationals of the rescuing State. These kinds of 
rescue missions are rather instances of protecting nationals abroad than humanitarian 
interventions since the objective is to remove the people. Also, humanitarian interventions are 
used to protect the nationals of the host State.
52
 Compared to humanitarian interventions, a 
protecting nationals abroad intervention can and should in theory be much less invasive of the 
host State’s territorial integrity or political independence. An example of a rescue mission in 
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which third States’ nationals were evacuated is the German mission in Albania in 1997. 
During Operation Libelle a total of 120 people from 22 different nationalities were rescued, 
only 20 of who were German.
53
  
The practice of protecting nationals abroad began in the 16
th
 century, during the awakening of 
sovereign States. With the beginning of migration of people and capital, States began to 
protect their nationals abroad by diplomatic means.
54
 An attack on a national was seen as an 
attack on the State.
55
 A new theory that allowed the use of armed force to protect persecuted 
nationals abroad appeared. The international law scholar H. Grotius (1585-1645) said: “/---/ 
Kings, and those who are invested with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a Right to exact 
Punishments, not only for Injuries committed against themselves, or their Subjects/---/.”56  
The legal foundation of the doctrine can be seen in the principles of 18
th
 century Swiss legal 
expert E. de Vattel, who announced: “Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, 
which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed 
and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the 
citizen will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is protection.”57 
In the 19
th
 century and the beginning of the 20
th
 century, before the Second World War and 
the UN Charter, most jurists agreed that the use of the doctrine was allowed.
58
 With that said, 
the practice of using armed force in order to protect nationals abroad was not uncommon.
59
 
However, the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad was interpreted very widely. For 
example, more than nowadays, the use of armed force in order to protect the property of 
nationals was accepted.  
Additionally, the right to protect nationals abroad was only one of the justifications given for 
interventions. For instance, the legality of the doctrine was justified as a reprisal against the 
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host State, as a right to self-preservation or as a right to self-defence. What is more, in some 
cases it was clear that the reason for using force was not to protect nationals from immediate 
danger, but to guarantee their safety in the future, reprisals or other political aspirations. Still, 
these interventions also contained a humanitarian aspect.
60
  
After the prohibition of use of force in the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928 and during the time of 
the League of Nations Covenant, the number of jurists supporting the legality of the doctrine 
decreased.
61
 What is more, among the scholars who did support the doctrine, there was still no 
consensus as to the legal basis of the doctrine: some believed it to be an autonomous right of 
intervention;
62
 others saw it as a legitimate form of defence.
63
  
Nowadays the doctrine is held to have much narrower application. The creation of the 
Charter, especially the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4), had a huge impact on 
the doctrine and created a debate over the legality of the doctrine.
64
 In modern law, the 
doctrine of protecting nationals abroad has two main legal justifications which will be 
examined subsequently.
65
 Additionally, after researching the protecting nationals abroad, an 
overview about non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) will be given. The reason for 
this is that there exists a stance that the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad has lost its 
importance today and in its place this new doctrine has been created.  
2.1.1. Protecting Nationals Abroad as an Action That Does Not Constitute a Use of 
Force within the Meaning of Article 2(4) 
The first legal basis for the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad that will be examined is 
that an intervention in order to protect nationals abroad does not constitute a use of force in 
the meaning of Article 2(4).  
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Firstly, it is suggested that the use of force to protect nationals abroad does not infringe on the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a State or occupy part of its territory.
66
 
Instead, it is said that the doctrine is focused merely on the protection and rescue of its 
citizens.
67
 If the force used does not infringe on the State’s sovereignty and is not intended to 
change the territorial boundaries, it does not breach the prohibition.
68
 O. Schachter has written 
in support of this interpretation and added three conditions that apply:  
1) there has to exist an emergency to save lives; 
2) a legitimate need for self-defense must occur;  
3) no derogation of the territorial integrity or political independence of the State in whose 
territory the action occurred can take place.
69
 
The scholars in support of this view also use this logic to defend the legality of similar 
doctrines. For example, in defending the doctrine on humanitarian interventions, M. W. 
Reisman and M. S. McDougal claim that while examining Article 2(4), it becomes clear that 
only the use of force for certain purposes is prohibited, not all uses of force per se.
70
  
This was in fact the justification the United Kingdom used in the Corfu Channel case. The 
claim was made that the minesweeping Operation Retail in the territorial waters of Albania 
“threatened neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of Albania. Albania 
suffered thereby neither territorial loss nor any part of its political independence.”71  
However, the ICJ did not accept this argumentation: “The Court can only regard the alleged 
right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given 
rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organization, find a place in international law.”72  
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The ICJ furthermore expressed their concerns that this kind of use of force would seem to be 
reserved for the most powerful States and could therefore “/---/easily lead to perverting the 
administration of international justice itself.”73 
T. Ruys also does not support the narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) and instead believes 
the prohibition of force to be comprehensive in nature as indicated by the wording “or in any 
other manner.”74 This means, that not only attacks on the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a State are prohibited.
75
  
What is more, the examination of the travaux préparatoires76 of the Charter, which describes 
the documentary evidence of the negotiation, discussions, and drafting of a final treaty text, 
leads to the conclusion that Article 2(4) was meant to serve as a broad prohibition of the use 
of force.
77
 The words “territorial integrity or political independence” were not added to be of 
qualifying nature, but to simply serve as examples.
78
  
I. Brownlie furthermore asserts that the wording under question should not be given, as 
Article 31 paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties says, its ordinary 
meaning, but instead it should be interpreted to have the same meaning it has often been given 
in international law – “the total of legal rights which a State has.”79 According to H. 
Lauterpacht, the phrase “territorial integrity” should be interpreted as “territorial 
inviolability.”80 
One further claim is that certain forms of self-help are not inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations. This argument asserts that for example the use of force for the protection 
of nationals abroad is a part of customary international law with the purpose of promoting 
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human rights and is therefore consistent with the purposes set out in Article 1 of the Charter.
81
 
However this reasoning is inconsistent with the systematic interpretation of the Charter. The 
Charter also names other purposes, such as international cooperation in solving international 
problems. This interpretation would lead to the conclusion that States are allowed to use force 
when other States that are uncooperative in finding solutions to international problems.
82
  
What is more, the first purpose mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter is the maintenance of 
international peace and security. M. Akehurst submits that the achievement of other purposes 
may not be the justification to breach international peace and security.
83
 Therefore, a more 
systematical interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the wording at the end of the 
paragraph 4 was added in order to draw attention to the exceptions mentioned expressis verbis 
in the Charter.
84
  
Yet another argumentation in support of this view is that Article 2(4) prohibits the use of 
force only insofar as the UN succeeds in its task of maintaining international peace and 
security.
85
 This is a reference to Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
which stipulates the convention omnis intelligentur rebus sic stantibus principle.
86
According 
to this principle, a tacit condition exists that treaties cease to be obligatory when the facts and 
conditions upon which the treaty was founded have substantially changed.
87
 If Article 2(4) 
prohibits the use of force by States then the UN must guarantee their safety. However, due to 
the fact that the Security Council includes 5 veto powers and the General Assembly is slow to 
reach conclusions, sometimes the reaction to breaches of peace take too long or are 
ineffective. In this case, it is submitted that the pre-Charter legal order applies.  
The counterargument, again, derives from the systematic reading of the Charter. I Brownlie 
maintains that the authors of the Charter must have predicted the possibility of the slow or 
imperfect reaction of the UN and so, this cannot constitute an unforeseen change of 
                                                 
81
 D. W. Bowett. 1958. Pp 17, 186; J. Stone, B. B. Ferencz, J. Perkovich. Pp 43, 95-96.  
82
 M. Akehurst. P 16.  
83
 M. Akehurst. P 16. 
84
 I. Brownlie. 2003. P 268; M. Akehurst. P 16. 
85
 A. Cassese. 2005. P 368; F. R. Tesón. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. 2nd 
edition. New York: Transnational Publishers 1996. Pp 157-162; P. C. Jessup. A Modern Law of Nations. An 
Introduction. Hamden: Archon Books 1952. Pp 170-171; U. Beyerlin. Die israelische Befreiungsaktion von 
Entebbe in völkerrechtlicher Sicht. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1977, 
volume 37. P 241.  
86
 M. N. Shaw, C. Fournet. Commentary of Article 62. In: O. Corten, P. Klein (editors). Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. A Commentary. Volume 2. New York: Oxford University Press 2011. P 1412.  
87
 H. C. Black, J. R. Nolan, et al. Black’s Law Dictionary. Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and 
English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern. 6
th
 edition. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 1990. P 1267.  
20 
 
circumstances.
88
 Seeing that the veto powers ended up on opposite sides of the Cold War soon 
after the adoption of the Charter, it was unavoidable that the Security Council would come 
across disagreements about international conflicts. Considering the amount of States 
represented in the General Assembly (even though the number was then smaller than what it 
has become now), it must have been clear that reaction would be slow. Still, no alternative for 
the case of an impasse in the Security Council was added to the Charter. The ICJ also spoke 
out against this interpretation in the Corfu case.
89
 
A broad interpretation of the prohibiting rule is also justified by Article 2(3) which obligates 
Member States to settle matters peacefully. What is more, other legal documents, like the 
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations,
90
 which reestablishes the prohibition of use of 
force, support this interpretation.
91
  
Taking the aforementioned into account, the argument that the right to use force to protect 
nationals abroad derives from the fact that such uses of force do not infringe on Article 2(4), 
is a weak one at best. The author of this thesis tends to agree with the majority of scholars that 
the prohibition of force laid down in Article 2(4) should not be interpreted narrowly. Still, to 
get a complete overview, state practice also has to be considered. This will be done 
subsequently in Chapter 2.2 infra.  
2.1.2. Protecting Nationals Abroad as Self-Defence  
The second and more widespread approach holds that protecting nationals abroad constitutes 
an exercise of the right of self-defence. The doctrine of protecting nationals abroad as part of 
the right to self-defence is a very controversial one. States and legal scholars have been 
disagreeing on the compatibility of the doctrine with the UN Charter since its adoption and 
some (mostly Western) authors have come to the conclusion that States have the right to use 
armed force to protect the life, health, and in some cases the property of their own nationals.
92
 
Lord A. McNair, a former President of the ICJ has Stated that if local authorities are either 
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unable or unwilling to protect nationals from violence, the State has the right to protect them 
and their property.
93
  
However, the scholars that support this view are divided on the question what exactly the 
legal basis is. Some argue that since Article 51 legalizes States’ “inherent” right to self-
defence, it can be concluded that the Charter did not intend to change the customary law that 
allowed the protection of nationals abroad. Accordingly, supporters of this view believe that 
the content of the right to protect nationals abroad can be determined by customary 
international law. Others claim that an attack on a State’s nationals can be considered as an 
attack on the State itself and therefore, protecting nationals abroad constitutes a form of self-
defence, which is allowed under Article 51.  
The first group of authors submit that the right is derived from the pre- and still existing 
customary international law allowing self-defence which inter alia extends to the protection 
of nationals abroad. D. W. Bowett justifies this view with the argumentation that the use of 
the word “inherent” in Article 51 refers to the fact that the authors of the Charter wanted to 
leave the customary law, including the customary rules concerning the protection of nationals 
abroad, lawful. D. W. Bowett acknowledges that the Charter sets some new limits to self-
defence, like immediate reporting to the Security Council, but retains that the Article does not 
imply the unlawfulness of using force to protect nationals abroad.
94
  
On the opposing side, the argument is brought that since a treaty has the power to change 
customary law, the adoption of the Charter, especially Articles 2(4) and 51, have not left the 
customary right of self-defence unabridged.
95
 According to this logic, Article 2(4) limits the 
use of force by individual States and thus ended the custom that gave States the right to 
protect nationals abroad.  
Yet, D. W. Bowett brings the counterclaim that the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad is 
compatible with Article 2(4) because such action does not infringe another State’s territorial 
integrity or political independence. Additionally, as there is no direct renouncement of the 
doctrine in the General Assembly’s Declaration of Friendly Relations, as there is of the use of 
force for reprisal reasons, D. W. Bowett concludes that the doctrine remains legal also under 
the Charter.
96
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Opponents of this view, like I. Brownlie, also claim that the custom of self-defence entails 
several forms of self-help, including self-protection and self-preservation, which are not 
compatible with the systematic interpretation of the Charter.
97
 However, D. W. Bowett retains 
that since in essence, both the doctrine and the Charter have a humanitarian basis, the doctrine 
is indeed consistent with the purposes of the Charter set out in Article 1 and should thus be 
considered legal.
98
 
The second group of supporters of the interpretation that the use of force for the protection of 
nationals is a form of self-defence maintain that an attack on nationals can be seen as an 
armed attack on the State as a whole and thus, it triggers the right to self-defence under 
Article 51. Already in the nineteenth century, jurists saw nationals as an extension of the State 
itself and as being as vital to a State as its territory.
99
 Thus, an attack on one’s nationals was 
also considered an attack on the State.  
H. Kelsen writes that in international law the essence of nationality is “nothing else but the 
status of legally belonging to the State” and concludes that a State has the right to protect its 
nationals.
100
 T. J. Farer claims that since people are a “necessary condition for the existence of 
a State,” the right to protect nationals derives from the right to self-defence concluded in the 
Charter.
101
 International law defines sovereign States as having a permanent population, 
defined territory, one government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereign 
State.
102
 Therefore, it can be argued that the right to protect nationals is stipulated in Article 
51 of the UN Charter.  
After the Second World War a number of scholars adopted this approach and they claimed 
that the content of the right to self-defence in Article 51 should be determined by customary 
law.
103
 This logic is based on the use of the word “inherent” in Article 51 which is claimed to 
refer to the still existing customary right to self-defence.  
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This interpretation predicates that a right to protect nationals abroad was a part of the 
customary law of self-defence when the Charter was adopted. The fact that States used the 
doctrine before the adoption of the charter
104
 supports this view. What is more, the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua judgement seemed to support this logic: “/---/Article 51 of the Charter is only 
meaningful on the basis that there is a “natural” or “inherent” right of self-defence, and it is 
hard to see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has 
been confirmed and influenced by the Charter. Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized 
the existence of this right, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For 
example, it does not contain any specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only 
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well 
established in customary international law.”105 
Some restrictive requirements for lawful use of force to protect the nationals abroad were 
concluded by C. H. M. Waldock. They are:  
1) an imminent threat of injury to nationals abroad;  
2) a failure or inability of the local sovereign to guarantee protection of them; 
3) the measures of protection are strictly confined to the object of protecting them against 
injury.
106
 
Even though scholars do not agree on whether or not protecting nationals abroad should be 
accepted as legal, there exists a general consensus that if the doctrine exists, these conditions 
apply.
107
 These are derived from the Webster formula concluded in the Caroline incident. The 
first requirement is basically the requirement of acting in self-defence of a threat that is 
overwhelming and leaves no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. The second 
corresponds to the provision on necessity. The last condition adds the requirement of 
proportionality.  
I. Brownlie opposes this interpretation by claiming that for the content of the doctrine to be 
defined by customary law, there should be references to the Webster formula or the Waldock 
criteria in some nineteenth century practice, which are, however, nowhere to be found.
108
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What is more, there are scholars that do not consider an attack on nationals enough for it to 
constitute an attack on the State. The definition of aggression in Article 3 of the UN General 
Assembly Definition of Aggression does not include the possibility of an attack on nationals 
to be considered an act of aggression.
109
  
However, firstly, Article 51 does use the wording “act of aggression.” Instead, the Article 
expresses the right of self-defence in the case of an “armed attack.” Article 6 of the Definition 
clearly states that it should not be interpreted in a way that increases or decreases the scope of 
cases where use of force is lawful in the Charter. D. W. Bowett suggests that the Resolution 
was intended to help the Security Council detect acts of aggression, which is its obligation 
under Article 39 of the UN Charter.
110
  
Secondly, even if an “act of aggression” was to be considered synonymous with the term 
“armed attack”, the list in Article 3 is not exhaustive, as Stated clearly in Article 4. What is 
more, paragraph (d) of Article 3 makes it evident that not exclusively attacks on a State’s 
territory can constitute an act of aggression.
111
 This means that theoretically an attack on 
nationals could be considered an act of aggression.   
However, according to the exceptions sunt strictissimae interpretationis principle, exceptions 
are to be interpreted narrowly.
112
 In the Nicaragua Case and later in the Oil Platform Case the 
Court maintained that “the most grave forms of the use of force” need to be distinguished 
“from other less grave forms” and that an armed attack involves “the sending by or on behalf 
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries and a State’s substantial 
involvement therein.”113 B. Simma and A. Verdross hold that in many cases the host State 
merely tolerates or supports the attack on other States’ nationals, without an active 
participation, and their behavior should therefore not be seen as an armed attack.
114
 
It should also be considered that the term “nationality” can generate some difficulties, since it 
has no legal definition.
115
 From the Nottebohm case it can be concluded that there should be 
some strong link between the State and its nationals, but there are no exact rules to determine 
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nationality.
116
 This could (and possibly already has) also become a problem if a State, seeking 
to misuse the doctrine, decides to start giving out passports, i.e. to “produce” nationals in 
order to later go and protect them. Russia, for example, has been accused for handing out 
passports in neighboring Georgia and Ukraine.
117
 What is more, Russia does not exclusively 
look after its nationals, but has also used force to protect Russian-speaking people, ethnic 
Russians and even its compatriots abroad.
118
  
It becomes clear that there is no consensus when it comes to the legality of the protecting 
nationals abroad doctrine. This is still a developing principle in international law and an 
analysis of the customary practice since the adoption of the Charter in 1945 could bring some 
answers.
119
 Whether or not the right to protect nationals abroad is well established in state 
practice, as some scholars contend, will help when drawing a conclusion about the legality of 
the doctrine. Therefore, invocations of the doctrine will be studied next. 
2.2. State Practice: An Overview of Invocations of the Doctrine After 
the Adoption of the Charter 
The practice of using force for the protection of nationals abroad is not uncommon in 
international law, even though the number of States that have relied on the doctrine is 
relatively low. In order to understand whether the doctrine should be seen as allowed under 
international law or not, an analysis of state practice is subsequently given.  
Not all the cases where the doctrine has been invoked will be analyzed. Instead, a selection of 
the most notable cases and instances since the adoption of the Charter, which sparked a 
conversation about the doctrine and where other justifications were not brought or where 
these played a minor role have been chosen.
120
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2.2.1. The UK in Iran in 1946 and 1951 and in Egypt in 1952 
In all of these cases, the United Kingdom contemplated using force to protect its nationals and 
either its or the nationals’ property without an actual use of force taking place. In 1946 riots in 
Iran constituted a threat to the British oil installations and the British nationals working there. 
The UK sent troops into bordering Iraq in order that they may “be at hand for the protection, 
should circumstances warrant it, of Indian, British and Arab lives, and in order to safeguard 
British interests in South Persia.”121 
In 1951 the UK again threatened to use force in Iran to protect its property by sending 
warships to Abadan near the Persian Gulf.
122
 The reasoning brought by the UK was that Iran 
was nationalizing the British-owned property illegally.
123
 Later the UK added that if need be, 
they would protect their nationals and claimed that they have a right and even an obligation to 
protect their nationals abroad.
124
 
One year later the UK planned on using force in Egypt in order to protect its nationals and 
their property during the riots in Cairo after nine British citizens were killed.
125
 However, 
since no real actions were taken, there was no reaction from the international community.
126
  
2.2.2. The Suez Canal Case in 1956 
In the first clear case of reliance on the protecting nationals abroad doctrine as a justification 
to use force since the adoption of the Charter, the UK, France and Israel intervened in Egypt. 
The nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian President was the motivation for this 
intervention.
127
 Thus, Operation Musketeer was launched.
128
   
During parliamentary debates about the case, the UK claimed that protecting nationals abroad 
was the justification for the action and that the Charter allows protecting nationals and their 
                                                 
121
 M. Akehurst. P 5; A. C. Arend, R. J. Beck. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the U.N. Charter 
Paradigm. Oxfordshire, England, New York: Routledge 1993. P 95.  
122
 D. W. Bowett. 1958. P 103.  
123
 A. W. Ford. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute 1951-1952. Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of 
California Press, Cambridge University Press 1954. P 58.  
124
 D. W. Bowett. 1958. P 103; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (jurisdiction), Judgement of 22.07.1952. ICJ Reports 
1952, p 93. P 26.  
125
 N. Ronzitti. Pp 27-28.  
126
 M. Akehurst. P 6.  
127
 Canal History. The Official Web Site of Suez Canal.  
128
 A. W. R. Thomson. P 648. 
27 
 
property abroad.
129
 According to the UK, legal basis for protecting nationals abroad was self-
defence. The UK interpreted Article 51 of the Charter as allowing the forcible protection not 
only of a State’s territory but also of its nationals abroad.130  
However, in the debates in the Security Council and the General Assembly, the UK mainly 
argued that it was protecting the international navigational rights through the Suez Canal and 
tried to prevent a clash between Israel and Egypt.
131
 Still, the need to protect nationals was 
also mentioned: “[W]e should certainly not want to keep any forces in the area for one 
moment longer that is necessary to protect our nationals.”132  
The reason for also relying on other justifications could be that there was no evidence that 
British nationals actually needed protection and it could be argued that danger to them was 
caused by the disproportioned reaction of bombing by the Royal Air Force.
133
  
Reactions by other States were quite critical. However, there was condemnation mainly of the 
motives of the intervening States and the application of the doctrine, not the doctrine per se 
and therefore no clear conclusions about the legality of the doctrine can be drawn.
134
 The case 
has become an example of how the doctrine can be abused.
135
  
2.2.3. The USA in Lebanon in 1958 
In 1958 American troops were sent into Lebanon to protect its nationals. The USA claimed 
that the legal basis of the doctrine is self-defence and, like the UK in the Suez Canal case, 
interpreted Article 51 in a way that allows a State to forcibly protect nationals in a State’s 
territory as well as abroad.
136
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However, later this justification was abandoned and the reason of the intervention was said to 
be to encourage Lebanese independence, while emphasizing that they were acting at the 
request of the local government.
137
 
Most of the discussion about the intervention concentrated on the collective self-defence, but 
there were also negative reactions towards the doctrine.
138
 For example India, Albania and 
Poland criticized the use of force to protect nationals abroad.
139
 Ethiopia expressed its concern 
that the doctrine is a means for powerful States to intimidate others and therefore should not 
be allowed.
140
  
2.2.4. Belgium in Congo in 1960 and With the USA in 1964 
After the independence of Congo, Belgium saw the need to save its own and others' nationals 
whose lives that were put in danger by non-State actors. In the Security Council debates 
concerning this intervention, Belgium claimed that the protection of nationals abroad is 
allowed by international law and a duty of the State.
141
  
The following countries supported Belgian claims: the USA, Italy, the UK, France and 
Argentina.
142
 France claimed that the protection of nationals does not violate Article 2(4), 
because of the humanitarian nature of the doctrine.
143
 Argentina even claimed that the 
protection of nationals is a “sacred duty to which all other considerations must yield.”144 Most 
Western States understood Belgian wish and need to protect their nationals.  
Several socialist and developing countries, including Congo, however, saw Belgium's actions 
as aggression because there had been no consent by the territorial State. The following 
countries agreed with Congo: Tunisia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and 
Poland.
145
 Resolutions proposed by the USSR condemning Belgian actions were rejected.
146
 It 
remains unclear whether the condemnation was towards the doctrine or the application of it, 
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but some authors believe that the condemnation was directed towards the application, not the 
doctrine per se. Two resolutions urged Belgium to draw its forces out of Congo.
147
  
Four years later an evacuation mission was launched by Belgium and the USA in order to 
rescue 1300 Europeans (1240 out of whom got evacuated) from Congolese rebels.
148
 Among 
the hostages there were Belgians, Greeks, Indians, Pakistanis, Italians, Portuguese, Togolese, 
Dutchmen, Americans, Canadians and Brits, whereas before the rescue mission, 35 of them 
were killed or tortured.
149
  
One important difference between this mission and the one that took place in 1960 is that this 
time Belgium and the USA had consent from the host State. The head of the Western-minded 
Government in Congo had sent an invitation to the US Government in which he approved the 
use of force to protect foreigners;
150
 however some States maintained the invitation was not 
given by the legal representative of Congo.
151
  
The UK claimed that the protection of nationals abroad was allowed under international law, 
without mentioning the need for consent.
152
 France also supported the operation.
153
 Some 
States, like Nigeria, Bolivia, Brazil and China seemed to support the idea that the consent 
made the operation legal.
154
  
On the other hand, some African and Asian States, Yugoslavia and the USSR deemed the 
intervention as an attempt to support the Western-minded Government in Congo, which some 
of them did not consider the legal government and thus not qualified to extend an invitation to 
the USA and Belgium.
155
 Ghana and the United Arab Republic
156
 denied the legality of the 
use of force to protect nationals abroad completely.
157
 A resolution, which requested States 
not to intervene in Congo, was adopted.
158
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2.2.5. The USA in the Dominican Republic in 1965 
As the Dominican civil war posed a threat to the people in the Dominican Republic, the USA 
initially defended its intervention with the fact that it was there to protect American and other 
nationals’ lives.159 Later, invitation to intervene and regional peacekeeping were added to the 
list of justifications.
160
  
Both in Lebanon in 1958 and in Congo in 1964 the USA had had permission to intervene, but 
this time, there was no effective government to grant it.
161
 Only one faction of the civil war 
gave the USA the consent to intervene, whereas the opposing side did not.
162
 This situation 
draws attention to a common problem about the legality of the consent.  
Reactions to the interventions varied. The Netherlands expressed their gratitude for rescuing 
Dutch nationals.
163
 So did the UK, which also maintained, once again, that the use of force to 
protect nationals abroad is legal under international law.
164
 China also did not regard the 
action as an act of aggression.
165
 France’s Statement was similar to the one made by the UK, 
but also addressed the question about the real intent of the intervention and the limits of the 
doctrine.
166
  
Some States, for example Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, claimed 
the intervention was illegal.
167
 Jordan, the USSR and Cuba maintained the doctrine was used 
merely as a pretext to intervene.
168
 The Ivory Coast expressed the opinion that the UN Charter 
had been violated.
169
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2.2.6. The Mayaguez Incident in 1975 
In 1975 the American merchant vessel Mayaguez was seized in the territorial waters of 
Cambodia due to suspicions of espionage. The objective of the subsequent American 
intervention was to rescue the vessel and the people aboard. The USA claimed that it was 
using self-defence in accordance with Article 51.
170
  
This time, there was no doubt that the USA did not have consent of the territorial State – the 
territorial State Cambodia deemed the intervention an act of aggression.
171
 Reactions of the 
international community were also largely negative. For example China said the actions 
constituted a case of piracy.
172
 The case was not discussed in the Security Council, but the 
representative of Somalia mentioned it as an example of aggression in a different 
discussion.
173
  
2.2.7. The Entebbe Raid in 1976  
This case is said to be a textbook example of the doctrine. In 1976, Pro-Palestinian terrorists 
took over the control of a passenger airplane on its way from Tel Aviv to Paris and redirected 
its flight to Uganda, where it consequently landed in the Entebbe airport.
174
 Some passengers 
were released, but not the Jewish hostages, most of who were Israeli but some also other 
States' nationals.
175
 After week-long negotiations failed to convince the hostage-takers to 
release the people, the Israeli Defence Force intervened without consent of the Ugandan 
Government.
176
  
Operation Thunderbolt was successful in that almost all the hostages were rescued, but on the 
other hand 3 hostages, 1 Israeli officer, 7 terrorists and 20 Ugandan soldiers were killed and 
also some Ugandan military equipment was destroyed.
177
 Israel justified its actions by 
claiming that the local forces were cooperating with the terrorists, even though Uganda denied 
this.
178
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In the Security Council Israel claimed that if the intervening State is using force for the 
"protection of a State’s own integrity and its nationals’ vital interests when the machinery 
envisaged by the United Nations Charter is ineffective in the situation," Article 2(4) is not 
violated.
179
 Israel also and primarily maintained that Article 51 allowed States to use force for 
the protection of nationals abroad if the host State was either unwilling or unable to do so.
180
 
Israel was supported by the USA and, to a lesser extent, by the UK.
181
 France argued that the 
Israeli intent was not directed towards breaching the Ugandan territorial integrity, but the 
protection of lives,
182
 bringing thus attention to the link between intent and sovereignty.
183
  
However, a majority of States opposed Israel’s actions. China, Cuba, Guinea, Guyana, India, 
Kenya, Libya, Qatar, Romania, Somalia, Tanzania and Yugoslavia qualified the actions as 
aggression.
184
 Benin, Cameroon, Mauritania, Mauritius, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and 
Uganda claimed Israel had used excessive force;
185
 therefore it could be that they were 
criticizing the application and not the doctrine.
186
 Tanzania and, it seems also Panama, 
deemed the doctrine illegal.
187
  
A proposition that Israel had not breached Article 2(4) was not agreed upon and even States 
that did not condemn Israeli actions did not defend the operation either.
188
 Sweden for 
example expressed the thought that even though the Israeli actions were illegal, Sweden also 
would not condemn the actions.
189
 Taking into account that there was no consensus about 
whether protecting nationals abroad was a legal justification for the use of force or not, the 
representative of Italy called for the UN to work out a paper to keep the same problem from 
occurring again.
190
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When examining state practice about the doctrine it should be taken into account that M. 
Akehurst maintains that this was not a typical case of protecting nationals abroad. He claims 
that if Ugandan forces were working with the hostage-takers, it was also responsible for the 
foreign nationals ending up in Ugandan territory (against their will and illegally) and therefore 
it cannot plead the right of territorial sovereignty against a State who wants to rescue its 
nationals.
191
  
2.2.8. The Larnaca Incident in 1978 
This was the first time a non-Western State – Egypt – relied on the doctrine. When the 
passengers of an airplane, including delegates of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity 
Organization were held hostage in an airport in Larnaca, Cyprus by a Palestinian dissident 
movement, Egypt intervened to save the hostages.
192
   
This case is also sometimes seen as a textbook example of the doctrine. Even though Egypt 
never relied on the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad, but instead claimed it was their 
duty to fight terrorism,
193
 the similarities of this and the Entebbe case gives reason to also 
analyze this case within the framework of this thesis.  
The Cyprian Government was still negotiating with the terrorists when Egyptian forces 
carried out an attack, which resulted in the deaths of a number of Egyptian soldiers.
194
 Some 
Cyprian soldiers were injured as well.
195
  
While the Egyptians claim that since they got consent from Cyprus to land a plane, they also 
had consent to protect their nationals, Cyprus maintains that they did know the plane was 
carrying military forces and did not know of the planned operation.
196
 The Cyprian 
Government accused Egypt of violating their sovereignty whereas Egypt maintained it had 
acted legally.
197
 This case was not debated at the Security Council.
198
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2.2.9. The Tehran Hostage Crisis in 1980 
This case concerns an operation to save diplomats who were held hostage for over a year in 
the American embassy in Tehran. The USA tried using peaceful means first.
199
 Operation 
Eagle Claw to save 52 hostages was unsuccessful and eight American soldiers died
200
 and five 
were wounded.
201
 According to the USA, the inherent right to self-defence as Stated in Article 
51 is the legal basis for protecting nationals abroad if the host State is either unable or 
unwilling to do so.
202
 
Reaction from States varied – some claimed it to be a legal use of force. The UK and Egypt 
were the biggest supporters of the American intervention; other States expressing either 
approval or understanding were Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan and many European States.
203
 
Others, including China, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the USSR, condemned the 
action and Iran criticized it as an act of invasion.
204
 
The use of force to protect nationals in Tehran was not discussed in the Security Council, but 
it was the first case concerning the doctrine to be discussed in the ICJ. Regrettably, however, 
the Court pointed out that “neither the question of the legality of the operation of 24. April, 
1980, under the Charter of the United Nations and under general international law, nor any 
possible question of responsibility flowing from it, is before the Court.”205 So the ICJ did not 
reject, nor affirm the legality of the doctrine. Still, since the Court was preparing its decision 
on the matter as the rescue mission took place, the Court expressed its concern that such 
operations can undermine the ICJ’s judgements. Even so, the Court also expressed its 
understanding of the American frustration.
206
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2.2.10. The Granada and Panama Incidents in 1983 and 1989 
After the coup d’état in Grenada, the President of the USA said Operation Urgent Fury was 
necessary to evacuate American tourists and medical students.
207
 According to the USA, the 
protection of nationals, the legal basis for which is self-defence, was the main reason for the 
intervention.
208
  
Additionally, the USA also claimed that the operation was a humanitarian intervention to 
restore democracy and it was asserted that the governor general had invited Americans to 
intervene
209
 but the validity of the invitation is questionable.
210
  
Some States believed that the justifications were just a pretext and that the nationals were in 
no real danger and thus, that the intervention was illegal.
211
 The UN General Assembly also 
voted on a resolution, supported by 108 and opposed by only 9, deeming the intervention 
illegal.
212
 However, once again, most of the criticism was directed towards the application, 
not the legality of the doctrine.
213
 
Six years later, Operation Just Cause to protect the lives of American nationals included 
24000 men sent to Panama and a new government was set up with Guillelmo Endara as the 
new leader.
214
 Again, the USA claimed that the legal basis of the doctrine is self-defence 
deriving from Article 51.
215
 
Additionally, the USA brought other justifications for the use of force. These include: 1) 
protection of democracy in Panama; 2) fight against drug traffic; 3) assurance of adherence to 
the Panama Canal Treaty.
216
 The USA also claimed they had the mandate from President 
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Endara, but this invitation was of questionable value since the USA helped him regain 
power.
217
  
There were many negative reactions to the intervention, like a General Assembly resolution 
deploring the intervention
218
 but, similarly to the Grenada case, most States criticized the 
application and not the doctrine itself.
219
 Western States refrained from assessing the legality 
of the doctrine, but Latin-American States deemed the intervention as violating the 
Panamanian sovereignty.
220
 The USSR and China claimed the USA had violated international 
law.
221
 
A Security Council resolution condemning American actions was not passed due to vetoes 
from France, the UK and the USA
222
 but the General Assembly later adopted it.
223
 Scholars 
condemn the intervention because of disproportionality – only 3 American nationals were 
affected in Panama, but about 300 Panamanian civilians and 200-300 soldiers were killed and 
3000 wounded as a result of the intervention.
224
 
2.2.11. The USA in Libya in 1986, in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 
The intention of the interventions in Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan was not to rescue 
American or other nationals, but to prevent future attacks. In 1986, the USA tried to keep 
more attacks from taking place after a disco in West Berlin, where American soldiers often 
went to, was bombed.
225
 In 1998, possible future attacks against the US embassies of Nairobi 
and Dar Es Salaam were the reason for action.
226
 
In the 1986 case, States mostly criticized the fact that the connection between the Libyan 
Government and the attacks was not proven and that the intervention was not proportionate 
and retaliatory in nature.
227
 The clearest declaration about the doctrine was given by the 
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representative of Ghana, who spoke out against the legality to use force in self-defence for the 
protection of nationals abroad.
228
  
In the 1998 incident, again, mainly the lack of proof of the local governments’ connection to 
the bombings was criticized, as was the lack of proportionality – for example, during 
Operation Infinite Reach, a pharmaceutical factory was bombed.
229
  
In both latter cases, attacks took place not simply against nationals, but American soldiers and 
embassies. It could be argued that these targets have a closer connection to the State than 
nationals
230
 and this should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions about the legality of 
the doctrine.  
2.2.12. Russian Intervention in Georgia in 2008 
In 2008 Russia claimed that after Georgia took military action to gain control over separatists, 
its nationals in South-Georgia were in danger and thus, an intervention to protect Russian 
nationals was carried out.
231
 Russian President Medvedev claimed that the intervention was 
necessary to prevent genocide,
232
 although these claims were unwarranted.
233
 According to 
Russia, Article 51 permitted the use of force to protect nationals abroad.
234
  
Like several times in the past, most States were critical not of the doctrine but the application 
of it. Russian motives for the intervention and the disproportionality of the operation were 
criticized.
235
 In addition to claims that there was no real threat to Russian nationals and if 
there were, the Russian actions went beyond what was necessary to protect them, the prior 
distribution of Russian passports in the region was criticized.
236
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Georgia made an application to the ICJ on August 12
th
, however the Court decided it had no 
jurisdiction to preside over the case.
237
 In the Security Council, almost all States condemned 
Russian actions.
238
 The UK representative said that the Russian intervention was a “grave 
violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and the Russian “actions have 
gone beyond any reasonable, proportionate response.”239 Mikhail Saakashvili, the Georgian 
President, declared Russian actions an intrusion of territory.
240
  
Noteworthy is the reaction of the Panamanian Government. In a Statement in the Security 
Council they argued: “Panama is also concerned by and condemns the entirely 
disproportionate, and therefore illegitimate, use of force by the Russian Federation with the 
Stated aim of protecting its citizens and peacekeeping forces.”241 This wording indicates that 
if the use of force were proportionate, it would also be legitimate. Thus, during the American 
intervention in Panama in 1989 the application and not the right of protection of nationals 
abroad must have been condemned.  
2.3. States’ Standpoint While Discussing the Doctrine Beyond the 
Instances of Its Use 
The doctrine has only been invoked by a few different States. This can be either because the 
situations, in which a State needs to protect its nationals abroad are seldom or because not 
every State has the possibility to do so. Whichever the case, this gives reason to look at what 
States have said in other contexts. Subsequently, an overview of States’ standpoint while 
discussing the doctrine beyond the instances of its use will be given.  
In the process of adopting the Resolution on Non-Intervention only a few States expressed 
their views on the doctrine. In the first case, Cuba declared that it held the doctrine of 
protecting nationals and their property abroad illegal.
242
 Jamaica expressed the idea that 
interventions “for humanitarian reasons” could be permissible; however it remained unclear 
whether the support was for the protection of nationals or humanitarian interventions.
243
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During the discussions about the Friendly Relations Declaration, Mexico spoke against the 
doctrine.
244
 When discussing Article 33 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
Romania declared that the pretext of necessity cannot justify intervention to protect nationals 
abroad.
245
 
The travaux préparatoires of the Definition of Aggression reveals the proposals of several 
States on this matter. The USSR, Egypt, Iran, Mexico and Cyprus were against the legality of 
the doctrine.
246
 For example, the USSR wanted to add the intervention to protect nationals 
abroad to the list of acts that would not justify use of force.
247
  
This proposition was opposed by Belgium
248
 and the United Kingdom. Representatives of the 
latter assured that when lives of nationals are in danger and there is a failure or inability to 
protect nationals by the host State, actions taken in order to protect them are not acts of 
aggression, but self-defence.
249
 Representatives of the Greece and Dutch Government 
declared that when a State uses force to protect its nationals who form an ethnic minority 
abroad, that force cannot be seen as aggression.
250
   
It is also worth taking a look into the 1979 Convention against the Taking of Hostages since 
many of the cases in which the doctrine is relied on, the nationals are in danger because of 
hostage situations. Article 14 states that nothing in the convention should be “construed as 
justifying the violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a State in 
contravention of the Charter of the United Nations.” 251 The Convention regrettably does not 
clarify whether the doctrine should be seen as legal or not. If it is legal under the Charter, as a 
part of customary law or as self-defence, it is also under the Convention.
252
  
Algeria, Mexico, Syria and Tanzania suggested that States should not have the right to 
intervene in another State’s territory in hostage situations, but other States found that it was 
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unnecessary to add this to the text.
253
 Ultimately States agreed on a wording that did not 
clarify whether or not the use of force to rescue hostages from another State’s territory is 
legal.
254
  
In 2000, Special Rapporteur J. R. Dugard submitted a report for the International Law 
Commission while they were reviewing the subject of diplomatic protection. The objective 
was to give recommendations about how diplomatic protection should be carried out in the 
time where the importance of human rights is emphasized.
255
 Draft Article 2 of the so-called 
Dugard Report suggests that the use of force to protect nationals abroad is lawful, with some 
limitations (very similar to the Waldock criteria).
256
 J. R. Dugard claimed the right derives 
from the customary right to self-defence.
257
 However, only two delegates in the International 
Law Commission agreed with and supported him, with the rest denouncing draft Article 2.
258
  
Therefore, it is impossible to draw clear and explicit conclusions about States’ standpoints 
about the legality of the use of force to protect nationals abroad also after examining their 
stances while discussing the doctrine beyond the instances of its use.  
2.4. Conclusion 
Regrettably it becomes clear that since the adoption of the Charter, an establishment of the 
doctrine in treaty law, in a ICJ judgement, or in a Security Council or even a General 
Assembly Resolution, has not been successful. This is so despite the Italian Representative’s 
suggestion during the discussions about the Entebbe incident to draw up papers on the matter. 
In the cases in which the doctrine was discussed and a resolution was passed, individual cases 
and the specific application of the doctrine were assessed, but no clear assessment of the 
legality of the doctrine has been given.
259
  
There are some cases in which the use of force to protect nationals abroad was justified with 
the logic that this kind of action does not infringe on Article 2(4), however in most cases, self-
defence is used as justification.
260
 The implementation of the doctrine has ranged from limited 
short-term evacuation operations (for example in Entebbe or the Tehran hostage situation) to 
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essentially occupation of a certain region (like in Panama and Grenada). These examples 
demonstrate the strengths of the doctrine as well as the weaknesses. 
The doctrine has mostly been implemented for the protection of nationals, but also for other 
States’ nationals and for the protection of nationals’ and State’s property. In most cases the 
threat to nationals derived from a breakdown of public order in the host State or the 
unwillingness or inability of the territorial State to offer nationals protection. 
A tendency to criticize the application of the doctrine instead of claiming that the use of force 
to protect nationals abroad is entirely illegal can be seen. Recent state practice of interventions 
aimed at rescuing foreigners abroad, as long as the Waldock criteria are respected, have gone 
almost absolutely unchallenged.
261
 
A clear conclusion of the case study since the adoption of the UN Charter is that the doctrine 
has been evoked on a number of accounts, but only by limited number of States. With a few 
exceptions, Western Powers are the ones to use force with the justification of protecting 
nationals abroad. Similarly, almost invariably the host State is a developing country. It is then 
unsurprising that mostly Western Countries accept the protection of nationals abroad doctrine 
as legal and other States seem to oppose it. 
States that have either relied on the doctrine, or expressed support or understanding for the 
need of it are: the USA, the UK, France, Egypt, Japan, Israel, Thailand, Germany, Belgium, 
Argentina, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and Russia.  
States that have opposed the use of the doctrine are: China, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Saudi-
Arabia, Iran, Albania, socialist Poland, Congo, Tunisia, Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Ghana, Egypt, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Guyana, Kenya, Libya, Qatar, Romania, 
Somalia, Tanzania, Benin, Cameroon, Mauritania, Mauritius and the USSR.  
Considering that the use of this doctrine is confined to a small number of countries, it could 
be argued that it lacks wide-spread acceptance which is necessary for it to be customary law. 
Since all the justifications for the legality of the doctrine contain an element or reference to 
customary law, this might be an argument against the legality of the doctrine. On the other 
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hand, the fact that other countries do not use force to protect their nationals abroad might not 
derive from the belief that it is illegal, but the lack of means to do so.
262
  
Also, they might not have been in such a situation where nationals need to be protected and it 
could be speculated that were such a situation to arise, some States might change their minds. 
As has, it seems, Russia. Whereas the USSR repeatedly and consistently argued against the 
doctrine, Russia, its legal successor, has now not only accepted the legality of, but has already 
relied on the legality of the use of force to protect nationals abroad.  
What is more, the responsibility to “guarantee to its citizens protection and patronage abroad“ 
is now enstablished in the Russian Constitution.
263
 In addition, the Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation States that Russia views its objective as „protecting rights 
and legitimate interests of compatriots living abroad on the basis of international law and 
treaties concluded by the Russian Federation while considering the numerous Russian 
diaspora as a partner, including in expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian 
language and culture.“264 
Another interesting fact that appears from this analysis is that Egypt protested the use of this 
doctrine in the Suez Channel case in 1956 and during the Belgian and American intervention 
into Congo in 1964, but supported it in the case of Larnaca in 1978. This casts a shadow of 
doubt over the importance of state practice and illustrates the fact that international law is 
greatly influenced by international politics. It seems that D. W. Bowett was correct when he 
claimed that a State’s opinion on the legality of the doctrine “depends as much on 
considerations of policy as on legal argument.”265 
Most commonly, States have not clearly stated their views on the matter. These States’ 
criticism does not condemn the doctrine as such. The abusive application of the doctrine is 
what is most often disapproved of.
266
 Regrettably, after analyzing state practice, it becomes 
clear that the doctrine in question can be open to abuse and be used as a pretext for a State’s 
intervention in another State’s domestic affairs. For example, when Russia invoked the 
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doctrine in 2008 in Georgia, Western States did not challenge the doctrine itself, but rather the 
disproportionality and motives behind the intervention.
267
  
The problem with the doctrine is that it is easy for powerful States to use it as an excuse for 
following political ambitions. Some examples include the UK in the case of the Suez channel 
in 1956 and the USA in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Although they claimed to be 
protecting nationals abroad in hindsight it could be argued that they had alternative motives. 
Another bad example would be the USA in the Mayaguez case in 1975. But the fact that there 
is practice of breaking a rule, for example the disproportionality of some interventions, does 
not change the fact that there could be a rule. The legality of the doctrine remains unclear.  
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3. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations  
3.1. Theory of NEOs 
Some scholars have come to the conclusion that due to the vulnerability to abuse and the 
inability of States to agree on its legality, the classical doctrine of protecting nationals abroad 
should be abandoned.
268
 This however does not mean that States should not have any 
opportunities to help their nationals outside of their territory. These authors simply propose 
that there should be a shift from protecting to rescuing nationals abroad.  
For this reason, a new doctrine – non-combatant evacuation operations – has been proposed. 
The purpose of NEOs is to quickly and safely move non-combatant evacuees from abroad if 
their lives are in danger from natural disasters, civil unrest or wars. 
A couple of States have already adopted this new doctrine in their domestic regulation. Some 
of these include the USA, the UK, France, Canada and Australia.
269
 Additionally, NATO has 
also accepted this doctrine.
270
 Non-combatant evacuations have mostly been carried out by the 
USA and the UK
271
 and have been used for evacuations from natural as well as man-made 
disasters, such as unrests in political order and wars.
272
  
It is suggested that state practice since the 1990s has created this new kind of military 
operation and that the fact that the interventions have not led to discussions in the Security 
Council or protests by host States, seems to indicate that States believe these operations to be 
legal.
273
 What is more, also States that previously opposed the protecting nationals abroad 
doctrine might now accept the new doctrine. 
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Reacting to the recurrence of NEOs,
274
 the UK concluded the first guide for them in 1998, 
according to which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is responsible for the protection of 
nationals abroad.
275 
The Office can be supported by the Ministry of Defence if need be.
276
  
Five years later, Canada adopted a similar regulation that states that the Canadian 
Government has the ultimate responsibility to protect its nationals.
277
 Outside of the Canadian 
territory, that responsibility belongs to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, who can be supported by the armed forces.
278
  
In the USA, evacuation operations are led by the Department of State and NEOs are 
conducted with the military assistance of the Department of Defense, mostly when the local 
government is unable to protect American nationals due to natural disasters or armed 
conflicts.
279
 According to the American regulation, it is allowed to evacuate non-combatants, 
nonessential military personnel and selectively nationals of the host State as well as third 
sates, whose lives are in danger.
280
 Additionally the evacuation of volunteers of non-
governmental and private voluntary organizations, information officers and members of 
media organizations is allowed.
281
  
The organizers of the operation have to have knowledge about the domestic national law, 
international treaties and customary international law and take into account the national law of 
the host State.
282
 Coordination, for example by concluding status of forces agreements,
283
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memorandums of understanding or by drafting rules of engagement and communication with 
the territorial State is said to help make sure the operation is conducted legally.
284
   
NATO defines NEOs as operations that are concluded either domestically, bilaterally or 
internationally and during which non-combatants are removed form a dangerous situation 
abroad to a safe place.
285
 While the Australian rules differentiate between situations where the 
host State is not opposed to the operation and has maintained the necessary control over the 
State to be able to give permission (so-called Services assisted evacuations) and between 
situations where the local government either has no control over the State or is opposed to the 
operation (so-called Services protected evacuations),
286
 the NATO definition of NEOs 
includes both situations.
287
   
Depending on the nature of the environment, operations are divided into three: permissive, 
uncertain and hostile.
288
 In the first case, it is argued that the territorial State will not oppose 
the operation and consent can be presumed and in the two latter cases, the government is 
thought to not have enough control over the State to give consent for a rescue mission, 
whether it supports the operation or not, or if such a government exists but it is either unable 
or unwilling to protect the nationals.
289
 Therefore, permission is not seen as a prerequisite and 
one of the following is put forward as the legal base for the intervention: pre-Charter custom 
or state practice that allows NEOs or self-defence under Article 51.
290
  
Different States have claimed different legal bases for the right to evacuate. Most States share 
the opinion that a consent given by the territorial State or permission from the Security 
Council are two possible legal bases for carrying out non-combatant evacuation operations. 
However, in situations where there is no possibility to ask for consent, for example when 
there is chaos and no functioning government, the right to self-defence, in accordance with 
the Waldock criteria, has also been mentioned as the legal base. This kind on justification has 
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for example been brought by the UK (Article 51),
291
 Australia (inherent)
292
 France 
(inherent)
293
 and arguably by Canada (inherent).
294 
  
In any case, the use of force can only be used to the extent that is necessary and proportionate 
to conclude the operation.
295
 Thereby it is important to note that the use of force is only 
allowed for the protection of oneself and others, mainly evacuees.
296
 The Canadian doctrine 
indicates that NEOs are only to be used in defence, not offence. R. Chaloux writes in his 
paper about Canadian non-combatant evacuation operations: „[NEOs] are conducted to 
reduce to a minimum the number of citizens at risk and to protect them during the evacuation 
process. They are not an intervention in the issues in the host nation.”297 
A view into state practice can bring some clarity as to whether NEOs are a part of 
international law. In recent years, there have been many smaller or larger NEOs. Some 
smaller ones include the American Operation Shepherd Sentry in the Central African 
Republic in 2002 and Operation Shining Express in Liberia in 2003.
298
 Below, some notable 
examples of NEOs will be briefly discussed. 
3.2. State Practice Concerning NEOs 
3.2.1. Operation Sharp Edge 1990-1991, Operation Assured Response in 1996 and 
Operation Noble Obelisk in 1997 
One noteworthy example of a non-combatant evacuation operation is the American Operation 
Sharp Edge in Liberia in 1990-1991.
299
 After the First Liberian Civil War broke out in 1989 
and threats by a rebel leader were made to arrest all foreigners in Monrovia and as a response 
to the general deterioration of security in Liberia, the USA sent 225 soldiers to Liberia.
300
 The 
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USA acknowledged the operation initiated by the American Ambassador to Liberia as a non-
combatant evacuation operation.
301
 
In addition to 226 Americans Canadian, French, Iraqi, Italian and Lebanese nationals, a total 
of 2400 people, were evacuated from the Liberian capital city.
302
 There was no consent from 
either aspiring leader of the country for the USA to intervene.
303
  
Third States seemed to be content with the intervention or as R. B. Lillich observed, there 
seemed to be a “near-complete absence of legal or other criticism” of the two week American 
operation.
304
 A factor that might have helped with the international recognition of the 
operation might have been that no weapons were fired during the rescue mission.
305
  
Five years later, in 1996, President Clinton announced the evacuation Operation Assured 
Response because of the „deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to 
American citizens“ in Liberia.306 The aim of the operation was to evacuate „private U.S. 
citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy 
compound.“307 During the initial stages of the NEO 2100 civilians, 435 of who were 
Americans and the rest nationals of 72 different countries, were rescued.
308
  
In May 1997, after a coup ousted the first democratically elected government in Sierra Leone 
in three decades, the USA launched Operation Noble Obelisk in order to evacuate about 450 
Americans (civilians and employees of the Embassy) and over 2000 nationals of other 
countries.
309
 The operation was deemed a success and the US Defense Secretary commended 
it as „safe, fast and efficient.“310 
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3.2.2. Evacuation Operations in Albania in 1997 
The German Operation Libelle was just one of several rescue operations undertaken by 
Western Countries in Albania in 1997, as a response to armed riots in Tirana.
311
 This was the 
first time, since the Second World War, that German soldiers shot their guns outside of 
Germany.
312
 In total, 250 shots were fired and 120 people of 22 different nationalities were 
rescued, out of whom only 20 were Germans.
313
 
The American rescue mission was called Operation Silver Wake and during it, about 900 
civilians were evacuated.
314
 Additionally, during Operation Kosmas 52 Greek citizens, as well 
as 5 Belgians and a number of Jordanians and Palestinians were rescued by the Greek navy.
315
 
Whereas it seems that other European States had been invited to intervene in Albania, 
Germany did not have the consent of the local government.
316
 Still, it could be argued that 
there was implied consent.
317
 Since the operations were proportional there was very little 
criticism.
318
 
3.2.3. The Thai Evacuation Operation in Cambodia in 2003 
In 2003 public demonstrations in Cambodia over who controls the Angkor Wat temple turned 
violent and after riots in front of the Thai embassy, one man was presumed dead.
319
 As a 
reaction, the Thai Prime Minister threatened to use force to evacuate several hundred 
nationals after attacks on them and the Thai embassy in Phenom Penh.
320
  
Later, with cooperation by the Cambodian army, an evacuation operation was carried out and 
over 500 Thai nationals were relocated with the help of four military transport planes.
321
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Similarly to the Libelle and other recent evacuation operations, this mission was also not 
criticized.
322
  
3.2.4. Lebanon in 2006 
Another notable example of a NEO is the exceptionally large operation concluded in Lebanon 
during the Israeli-Hizbollah conflict in 2006.
323
 During the summer of 2006, in order to try to 
force Israel to release Lebanese prisoners, the Hezbollah paramilitary forces launched a 
military operation and killed several Israeli soldiers and took two as prisoners of war.
324
 
In reality, there were several evacuation operations carried out by several States. The USA 
evacuated about 15000 nationals
325
 and during Operation Highbrow, the UK rescued 4500 
people, roughly 2500 of who were British citizens.
326
 Further evacuation operations were 
conducted for example by Sweden (some 7000), Canada (approximately 7000 nationals), 
France (about 4500 French nationals and 1200 foreigners), India (nearly 2000), Italy (767), 
Spain (at least 539), Poland (about 220), Russia (almost 200) and China (143).
327
  
These numbers shows that the Israeli-Hizbollah conflict brought about one of the most 
extensive multinational evacuation operations in recent history. Following the trend of earlier 
rescue operations, this case was not discussed in the Security Council and there was no 
condemnation of the operations by the international community.
328
  
3.2.5. Evacuation Operations in Libya in 2011 
During the Arab Spring in 2011, Libya experienced large-scale unrests and a civil war 
between forces loyal to the country’s leader of more than 40 years, Muammar Gaddafi, and 
his opponents.
329
 Gaddafi used the Libyan military as well as mercenaries to defeat the 
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opposition, but in the end he was unsuccessful.
330
 As a result of this, several States decided to 
evacuate their nationals from the conflict region.  
For example, China deployed 19 chartered flights and three vessels in order to evacuate a total 
of almost 35900 Chinese nationals as well as 41 Maltese, Italian, Croatian, Vietnamese and 
Filipino citizens.
331
  
The UK Operation Defence, lasting less than a month,
332
 began on 24 February when 64 
people, including 51 British citizens were picked up in the Tripoli airport and transferred to 
Malta.
333
 During the first days of the operation, around 600 British nationals and over 1000 
foreign nationals from 43 different countries were evacuated.
334
  
3.3. Conclusion 
A clear trend can be seen that the protection if nationals abroad with the help on non-
combatant evacuation operations have been successful and proportional. Usually, a large 
amount of people have been evacuated from a dangerous situation in a matter of a short 
period of time. The assessment of the US Defense Secretary to the rescue mission in Sierra 
Leone could apply to most NEOs – they tend to be „safe, fast and efficient.“335 Also, NEOs 
do not seem to be carried out for the protection of any kind of property.
336
  
Another trend is that not only the nationals of rescuing State are evacuated, but also other 
nationals are offered help. At times, the amount of foreign nationals supersedes the number of 
the nationals of the rescuing State. This aspect should be seen as a positive development 
because it has been suggested that one of the reasons so few different States carried out 
operations to protect their nationals, was the fact that they lacked the means to do so.
337
 In 
light of this change, also nationals of less powerful States can receive help. This was for 
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example the case in Lebanon in 2006, when Norway and Finland helped evacuate 10 
Icelandic nationals.
338
  
An additional tendency appears to be that these operations have not been criticized by the 
international community. Therefore, the author of this thesis agrees with the conclusion made 
by A. W. R. Thomson: “The NEO is well established in both doctrine and practice.“339  
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4. Possible Changes in the Doctrine of Protecting 
Nationals Abroad 
Even though Russia has brought several justifications for its actions in Crimea, the protection 
of nationals abroad was the original pretext for military action in Ukraine.
340
 As we know, 
international customary law is composed of state practice (longa consuetudo) and opinio 
iuris. In order to figure out whether Russia has managed to change international customary 
law with its actions, both of these aspects have to be examined. Therefore, subsequently an 
overview of the Crimean Crisis will be given. 
As we have seen, state practice where the protection of nationals abroad doctrine has been 
relied on, is limited. However, if Russia’s actions in Ukraine are to be considered as state 
practice that might give rise to the emergence of new customary international law, it makes 
sense to continue with an examination of opinio iuris. In other words, did the international 
community believe that the actions carried out in Crimea were legal?  
4.1. State Practice: Russia’s Invasion into Ukraine 
4.1.1. Historical Background 
Crimea was first annexed by Russia in 1783, having formerly belonged to Turkey and mostly 
inhabited by Crimean Tatars.
341
 After the annexation, demographics changed due to land 
being distributed to Russians and furthermore by Tatars being deported in 1944.
342
 
Subsequently, by the time the 1979 census was carried out, only 0.3% of the population in 
Crimea was Tatar; Russians constituted the majority with 68.4% and Ukrainians were the 
second biggest ethnic group with 25.6%.
343
  
During Soviet rule, First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev transferred 
Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic in 1954 so that after the Ukrainian independence in 1991, Crimea stayed in 
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the Ukrainian territory.
344
 Notwithstanding, Crimea was given a large amount of autonomy 
and its official name was the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within Ukraine.
345
  
Sevastopol, a city located in the southwestern region of Crimea, was home to the Soviet Black 
Sea Fleet. After the Ukrainian independence, Russia refused to recognize Ukrainian 
sovereignty over Crimea, until 1994, when the Budapest Memorandum was signed by Russia, 
the UK, the USA and France. According to the memorandum, Russia recognized Ukraine in 
its borders and in return Ukraine delivered its nuclear weapons to Russia.
346
  
Still, fighting over the Black Sea Fleet and the port continued until the bilateral Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine was signed.
347
 This treaty helped 
confirm Ukrainian State borders and confirmed the Ukrainian sovereignty over Sevastopol, 
but in a separate 1997 status of forces agreement on the Black Sea Fleet it was agreed upon 
that Ukraine will lease the land to Russia for 25 years with the possibility to prolong the 
lease.
348
 Later, in April 2010, the lease was extended for another 25 years, that is, until the 
year 2024.
349
 In 2003, the bilateral Agreement on the State Border between Ukraine and 
Russia was signed.
350
 
By the 2001 Ukrainian census, ethnic Russians comprised 58.5%, Ukrainians 24.4% and 
Crimean Tatars 12.1% of the Crimean population.
351
 After the annexation of the territory, 
Moscow terminated the bilateral treaties due to an alleged fundamental change of 
circumstances under Articles 61 and 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
352
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4.1.2. Overview of the Crimean Crisis353 
In order to understand the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Crimean Crisis better, a 
short overview of how the Crisis evolved will subsequently be given.  
The Russian military intervention into Ukraine started after the Ukrainian revolution and 
Euromaidan movement in February 2014. This was followed by pro-Russian unrest in Eastern 
Ukraine and a secession crisis in Crimea which subsequently led to the Crimean status 
referendum held on March 16
th
 2014.  
Allegedly, the referendum on whether to join Russia had a turnout of 83% and more 
incredibly, 97% of them supposedly voted in favor of the annexation to Russia.
354
 President 
Putin reacted by saying that he will “respect the choice of the Crimean people.”355 Later this 
led to Russian legislation that enabled the incorporation of Crimea to Russian territory, even 
though the secession was in contradiction to the Ukrainian constitution.
356
 Even so, on March 
19
th
 the Russian constitutional court ruled that the annexation was in compliance with the 
Russian Constitution.
357
  
V. Bílková differentiates between two instances of use of force by the Russian Federation in 
Crimea: firstly the use of Russian units already deployed in Crimea and secondly the use of 
the so-called little green men, i.e. Russian servicemen in local-looking uniforms and without 
insignia.
358
 Thus, a couple of concrete examples of both will be brought.
359
  
Firstly, it has been reported that Russian servicemen operated outside their bases, for example 
by taking control over certain strategic locations like military installations in Crimea, by 
blocking the Black Sea ports and supporting the local pro-Russian militias,
360
 which was not 
in accordance with the rules set out in the 1997 status of forces agreement on the Black Sea 
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Fleet. This kind of action also probably violates the prohibition of the use of force and, 
according to Article 3 paragraphs (c) and (e) of the UN General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression,
361
 could constitute acts of aggression.  
There were also reports of presence of military personnel equipped with Russian weapons, 
military vehicles with Russian registration plates and Russian-made uniforms (albeit without 
the insignia).
362
 Although Russia first denied it, Putin later admitted that Russian forces had 
backed the Crimean pro-Russian forces.
363
  
The so-called little green men were firstly accused of taking actively part in military 
operations, for example occupying the Simferopol International Airport and military bases, 
blocking roads and creating security checks.
364
 Additionally, they were blamed for taking 
over some local public institutions, such as the Crimean parliament the Supreme Council.
365
  
These actions, like the actions discussed earlier, probably violate the prohibition of the use of 
force and constitute an act of aggression. This time the basis for the latter is paragraph (a) of 
Article 3, which states that an attack by the armed forces, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof, constitutes an act of aggression. 
While exercising military aggression in Ukraine, Russia relied on various arguments and 
justifications, some of which are the protection of Russian nationals abroad
366
 (i.e. in 
Ukraine), intervention by invitation by the former Ukrainian President Yanukovych
367
 and 
historic reunification.
368
 Still, as mentioned earlier, the protection of nationals abroad was the 
original reason.
369
 During the UN Security Council’s 7125th meeting Russia's Permanent 
Representative to the UN Vitali Churkin said: “In this extraordinary situation, which is not of 
our making and in which the lives and security of the inhabitants of Crimea and south-eastern 
Ukraine are under genuine threat from the irresponsible and provocative acts of gangs and 
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ultranationalist elements, we emphasize once again that Russia’s actions are entirely 
appropriate and legitimate.”370 
Taking the aforementioned into account, one can see that the Russian intervention in Crimea 
for the protection of their nationals abroad, was quite an extensive operation. On some 
accounts, there were about 30000 Russian troops in Crimea in the beginning of March 2014
371
 
and 7000 troops inside Ukraine and yet another 40000 - 50000 on the border with Ukraine in 
November 2014.
372
 The Russian intervention consequently led to the annexation of the 
territory.  
4.2. Opinio Iuris 
4.2.1. The International Community’s Reaction to Russia’s Actions in Crimea  
Next, the opinio iuris will be examined. An overview of reactions from different individual 
States and international organizations will assist in the evaluation of whether or not the 
international community and Russia thought that the intervention in Crimea was legal. First, 
the opinions of the international community will be analyzed and later, the Russian view will 
be examined.  
On March 27
th
 the UN General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution that declared 
Crimea's referendum on seceding from Ukraine invalid. Out of 193 Member States, 100 voted 
in favor, 11 against and 58 abstained.
373
 Several States, such as the United States, and 
international organizations, like the European Union, decided to apply sanctions against 
individuals and businesses from Russia as an expression of discontent with its actions. NATO 
condemned Russia's military actions and Stated that it constituted a breach of international 
law.
374
 The Council of Europe expressed its full support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.375 
Even representatives of China, who tend to support Russia’s policies, have spoken against the 
military intervention.
376
 Overall, most of the United Nations Member States have declared 
that they do not recognize the Russian rule in Crimea.  
                                                 
370
 UN Doc. S/PV.7125. 03.03.2014. P 4.  
371
 J. Boyle (editor). Ukraine says Russian troops in Crimea have doubled to 30,000. – Reuters 7.03.2014.   
372
 S. Harris. Thousands of Putin’s Troops Now in Ukraine, Analysts Say. – The Daily Beast 11.11.2014.   
373
 L. Charbonneau, M. Donath. U.N. General Assembly declares Crimea secession vote invalid. – Reuters 
27.03.2014.  
374
 North Atlantic Council Statement on the situation in Ukraine. Press release (2014) 033. 02.03.2014.  
375
 Standing Committee. PACE strongly supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. – 
Parlamentary Assembly 07.03.2014.  
376
 Economy, E. China’s Soft ’Nyet’ To Russia’s Ukraine Intervention. – Forbes 05.03.2014.   
58 
 
Ukraine declared that Russian forces had illegally entered Ukrainian territory and deemed 
their intervention an act of aggression.
377
 The Ukrainian claims were supported by 
representatives from Australia, the UK, the USA and Canada in the Security Council.
378
 
Furthermore, the British Foreign Secretary William Hague gave quite a harsh assessment of 
the intervention in a debate in the House of Commons: “No amount of sham and perverse 
democratic process or skewed historical references can make up for the fact that this is an 
incursion into a sovereign State and a land-grab of part of its territory, with no respect for the 
law of that country or for international law.”379 
As was explained earlier, there is no consensus on the legality of the use of force to protect 
nationals abroad. However, it is submitted that even if the doctrine was legal, it would still be 
highly unlikely that Russia’s military actions in Crimea fall within the limits of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. This is so mainly because prima facie the intervention does not meet some of 
the conditions of the doctrine, more exactly the preconditions of necessity and 
proportionality.
380
  
The right to invoke the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad does not emerge until it is clear 
that no other methods for achieving a peaceful resolution would work. The doctrine should 
only be used as a last resort. However, this does not seem to be the case in Ukraine. First of 
all, there was little evidence of any immediate threat to Russian nationals. As the United 
States permanent Representative to the UN put it: “There is no evidence, for example, that 
churches in eastern Ukraine are being or will be attacked. The allegation is without basis. 
There is no evidence that ethnic Russians are in danger. On the contrary, the new Ukrainian 
Government has placed a priority on internal reconciliation and political inclusivity. Acting 
President Turchynov has made clear his opposition to any restriction on the use of the Russian 
tongue.”381  
Secondly, even if the existence of a threat to the life or health (or even property) of Russian 
nationals could be proven, other means of finding a resolution were still applicable. Article 
33(1) of the UN Charter stipulates the obligation of Member States to seek peaceful means to 
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settle a dispute. Mainly using diplomatic means could have solved the crisis without having to 
resolve to military action. Moreover, Russia could have called for the UN to take action.  
As to proportionality, there are limitations placed upon actions taken in self-defence. As N. 
Lubell so eloquently put it: “/---/ actions taken in self-defence must /---/ be measured in 
relation to the achievement of this legitimate aim.”382 Some authors argue that the intensity of 
the force used should be about the same as the intensity defended against.
383
 Yet, even if one 
were to disagree and allow a response of greater magnitude, it can evidentially be submitted 
that the condition of proportionality was not fulfilled.  
Furthermore, the Russian invasion into Crimea can certainly not be seen as a non-combatant 
evacuation operation. First of all, Russia claimed to have the right to protect the members of 
the Black Sea Fleet.
384
 These people combatants and thus, by definition, a NEO cannot be 
launched for the evacuation of these nationals.  
What is more, as with the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad, also during a NEO the 
conditions of proportionality and necessity have to be fulfilled. As has been shown above, this 
has not been the case. To the contrary, the Russian operation culminated with the annexation 
of the Ukrainian peninsula rather than evacuation of the supposedly threatened nationals.  
Thus, it can be summarized that two conditions of the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad, 
necessity and proportionality, were not fulfilled. Additionally, the Russian intervention into 
Crimea was not a NEO. Therefore it is not surprising that the majority of the international 
community seems to agree that Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine was not a legitimate 
use of force.  
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4.2.2. Russian Opinio Iuris  
For the sake of argumentation, it is interesting to try to figure out whether Russia believed its 
own actions in Crimea to be legal. Even though it is difficult to examine such a subjective 
element, some evidence seems to point to the likelihood that also Russian opinio iuris does 
not exist.  
First of all, the fact that Russia used so many different justifications for the intervention 
shows that there was not enough trust in any of them. Similarly, for example, when the 
Security Council deemed Belgium’s protection of nationals in Congo illegal, Belgium made 
sure to have another justification (the consent of the legitimate Congolese authorities) four 
years later, when together with the US, another intervention was launched in Congo. 
Since these claims are many yet unconvincing, it is safe to assume that not even Russia 
expected the international community to believe in the legality of Moscow’s actions. 
However, they did seem to be successful in creating a certain amount of doubt. Confusion and 
the exploiting of uncertainty in international law seem to be a part of Putin’s tactic385 in order 
to try “to muddy the waters of international opinion.”386 Russia has been very productive in 
the use of non-military instruments of influence like media propaganda, legal rhetoric and 
diplomacy in order to create at least plausible deniability and give an impression that its 
actions are lawful.
387
 By doing this, Russia has managed to keep the West from taking 
effective action and on the other hand keep Putin’s domestic popularity rating high as ever.  
Secondly, while exercising military aggression in Ukraine, Russia denied that its forces had 
been involved in the Crimean Crisis until April 2014. As a contrast, Ukrainian authorities 
accused Russia of aggression in Crimea as early as the beginning of March.
388
 The denial 
might be an indication that the Russian Government did not believe in the legality of the 
military actions. There seems to be no other logical reason than at first, Moscow tried to hide 
their involvement and later, as the amount of evidence became too overwhelming to continue 
the denial, they had no other option than to bite the bullet and tell the truth.  
What is more, if the majority of the international community disagrees with Russia, it is 
difficult to believe that no doubt was aroused in Moscow. Not only were the actions 
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condemned, but also relatively severe sanctions were imposed on Russia. Of course, doubt is 
not enough to prove the nonexistence of opinio iuris, but combined with other arguments, the 
logical conclusion would be that even Russia probably did not believe in the legality of the 
actions in Crimea.  
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Conclusion: De Lege Ferenda   
After analyzing the state practice since the adoption of the UN Charter and the positions of 
different States and legal scholars it becomes clear that the doctrine of protecting nationals 
abroad is still developing. Therefore there is no certainty as to whether or not the use of force 
for this purpose should be considered legal.  
While there are good arguments on both the pro and contra side, the fact remains that States 
do rely on the doctrine and carry out operations for the protection of their nationals. Even 
though the amount of different countries doing so is not large, the strong belief that the 
doctrine is illegal is probably not the principal reason for this. This could for example be seen 
when Egypt at first denied the legality of the doctrine and later relied on it during the 
intervention in Larnaca in 1978.  
Taking into account that States mostly have criticized the application of the doctrine and not 
the concept per se, the author of this thesis concludes that the Achilles heel of the doctrine is 
its exposure to abuse. For example, it is quite clear that Russia has not been acting in good 
faith during the Crimean Crisis. First of all, the application of the protection of nationals 
abroad was neither justified nor proportional. Secondly, even if Russia believed it to be so, the 
opinio iuris of the majority of the intentional community states the opposite.  
With a view into the future, rather ironically it is important to keep in mind that ultimately 
Ukraine and the Western States have to abide by the rules, even if Russia has not. This means 
that if there is a wish to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it would not be lawful to resort 
to forceful measures against Russia unless measures other than force are likely to be 
unsuccessful in rectifying the wrong.  
As to the hypothesis of this thesis, the author concludes that the protection of nationals abroad 
doctrine has not been changed by Russia’s actions in Crimea since the doctrine was used as an 
excuse to follow political aspirations. Therefore, as before, the application limitations remain 
unclear.  
Whereas it is true that the doctrine is open to abuse, there is also a legitimate need for a 
possibility to protect nationals in some cases. If a State’s nationals were subjected to 
deliberate or widespread abuse, the State would be under great political pressure to act. It 
would be futile to demand inaction on behalf of that State. It is submitted that when weighing 
humanitarian interests versus political interests, the possible breaches of the law do not 
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outweigh the potential risks of denying the legality of action in an urgent situation. In the case 
of danger to the life and health of people, there is often no use of remedy after the fact.
389
  
This is especially true now, when there is a trend of human rights gaining importance because 
in essence, the protection of nationals is humanitarian. In these situations what is mainly 
needed is quick action. This is also the reason why an intervention under Article 42 cannot be 
seen as a viable alternative – sanctions by the Security Council take time.  
It is regrettable that the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, the ICJ or any other 
authoritative organization has not taken it upon themselves to fill this legal gap. Especially 
when taking into account that the Italian Representative called for a paper to be concluded in 
order to keep the same problems from occurring again. It is quite remarkable that all United 
Nations organs have managed to avoid taking a stand regarding the doctrine, especially 
because it has caused conflicts since the adoption of the UN Charter – almost 70 years now.  
However, after analyzing the theory and state practice of non-combatant evacuation 
operations, it is submitted that the new proposed doctrine could solve the problems that 
accompanied the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad. The discussed NEOs have been 
more proportional than most invocations of the old doctrine and have often not been criticized 
by the international community.  
Still, the author of this thesis believes that the status quo is not the optimal solution. It is clear 
is that there is an urgent need for legislation. International coherent regulation would 
eliminate the ambiguity of the legality of rescue missions for the protection of nationals and 
could prevent NEOs from having such negative effects as the old doctrine had.  
This is especially true since most of the antimony towards the latter has been caused either by 
its wrong, not proportionate or unnecessary application or the fear of smaller, developing 
States that powerful Western Countries will exploit the doctrine. This was the case in or 
example the Suez Canal case in 1956, the American interventions into Grenada in 1983 and 
into Panama in 1989, Belgium armed interference in Congo in 1960 and 1964 and more 
recently, Russia in Georgia and Ukraine.  
The author of this thesis submits that clear international legislation could help prevent 
potential instances of abuse. In order to act in a legal way, it is important to understand 
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international rules. Also, these valid international rules need to be reinforced so that 
international peace and security can be kept. When rules have been broken, a clear 
understanding is also necessary to find a long-term solution to the crisis.  
This all cannot be done without comprehensibility of when the use of force is legal and when 
it is not. Even if the solution is that the protecting of nationals abroad doctrine is deemed 
illegal, this would finally create legal certainty for the future. And even though at times it 
might be argued that there is no remedy except prevention, in the cases of illegal 
interventions, affected States would gain grounds for some sort of reprisals.   
There is a few legal scholars discussing the topic but regrettably their decisions and opinions 
are not legally binding. Therefore, that is just not enough. It is understandable that the 
Security Council might not be able to find a proper solution because of the five permanent 
Veto Powers. However, the task of the Sixth Committee, i.e. Legal Committee of the General 
Assembly is to deal with international legal matters.  
Alternatively, if the ICJ once again has the chance to discuss the matter, the author hopes this 
opportunity will not be left unused as it was during the Tehran case in 1980. After all, 
according to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, judgements of the Court serve as secondary 
sources of law for not only inter partes, but also generally.  
Additionally, this would be a prime opportunity to regulate possible misuses of the doctrine 
that have come into light during the Crimean Crisis, such as the active and fairly generous 
administration of Russian passports to the inhabitants of regions that Russian troops were 
going to enter. This is a justified question because similar practice of offering citizenship to 
people living in former Soviet States, such as Georgia, have been noted.  
Finally, some proposals for legislative improvements will be given. First of all, the Waldock 
criteria or some other analogous restrictions should apply to NEOs. Secondly, rescue missions 
should be limited to people. This means that NEO for the evacuation of property it should not 
be allowed. However, there are no good reasons for disallowing the rescuing of nationals of 
other States’. NEOs should be allowed for the evacuation of nationals from both natural as 
well as man-made disasters, such as unrests and wars.  
Furthermore, in the case of a permissive environment, i.e. when the territorial state has the 
power to grant permission, an invitation to intervene by the host state should be preferred to 
an intervention without consent. Cooperation with the local government, for example in the 
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form of status of forces agreements,  memorandums of understanding or by drafting rules of 
engagement can help with the fulfilment of the proportionality criteria.  
Even so, permission should not be seen as a prerequisite. This is especially true in uncertain 
and hostile environments, where the local government does not have enough control over the 
state to give consent for a rescue mission, or if such a government exists but it is either unable 
or unwilling to protect the nationals.   
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Relvastatud jõu kasutamine ja kodanike kaitsmine 
välismaal Krimmi kriisi vaguses. Resümee 
Aegade jooksul on rahvusvahelise õiguse kõige olulisemaks tunnuseks olnud riikide 
suveräänsus. Alates eelmisest sajandist on üha olulisemaks muutunud inimõigused, mis tihti 
seisavad vatuolus riigi suveräänsusega. Seda põhjusel, et vahel tuleb indiviidi õigusi kaitsta 
riigi suveräänsuse arvelt. Sellest tulenevalt on tekkinud arutelud nende doktriinide 
õiguspärasuse üle, mis riigi suveräänsust piiravad. Selliste doktriinide hulka kuulub ka 
kodanike kaitsmine välismaal.  
Nimetatud temaatika on oluline arvestades, et tänapäeval on riikide individuaalne relvastatud 
jõu kasutamine võrdlemisi piiratud. Õiguspäraselt käitumiseks on vaja rahvusvaheliste 
normide mõistmist. Veelgi enam, maailma rahu ja julgeoleku kaitsmise seisukohast on oluline 
kontrollida reeglitest kinnipidamist ning rikkumise esinemisel reageerida. See võib aga 
osutuda keeruliseks, kuna rahvusvaheline õigus on pidevas muutumises. Nii mõjutavad seda 
muuhulgas uued tehnikasaavutused, rahvusvaheliste poliitikate muutumine ja riikide praktika.  
Alates Ühendatud Rahvaste Organisatsiooni (ÜRO) loomisest 1945. aastal, ei ole 
õigusteadlased ja riigid suutnud kokkuleppele jõuda doktriini kodanike kaitsmine välismaal 
piirides ega õiguspärasuses. Doktriini idee seisneb selles, et riikidel on õigus oma kodanikke 
välismaal kaitsta ning see annab aluse rikkuda teise riigi suveräänsust.  
Venemaa kuulub ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu viie alalise liikme hulka ja on üks 
mõjuvõimsamaid riike maailmas. Riigil on potentsiaalselt tohutu mõju rahvusvahelisele 
õigusele ning senisest käitumisest on võimalik järeldada, et soov rahvusvahelist õigust 
Moskvale meelepärases suunas mõjutada on olemas.   
Venemaa tegevust Krimmis alates 2014. aasta algusest võib näha kui suurimat ohtu rahule 
Euroopas alates külma sõja lõppemisest. Need sündmused on jällegi elavdanud arutelu 
kodanike kaitsmise doktriini õiguspärasuse üle. Sekkumist kriisi kommenteerides väitis 
Venema, et kuna tema kodanikud olid Krimmi poolsaarel ohus, oli see militaarselt 
sekkumiseks küllaldane õigustus.  
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärk on uurida, kas Krimmi kriisi sündmused on olnud aluseks 
doktriini õiguspärasuse muutumiseks. Püstitatud hüpoteesi kohaselt ei ole doktriin muutunud, 
kuna Venemaa-poolne relvastatud jõu kasutus ei vastanud prima facie olemasolevatele 
doktriini reeglitele ja piirangutele.  
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On oluline mõista, kas Venemaa rikkus rahvusvahelisi norme, kuna see aitab kriisile 
pikaajalise lahenduse leidmisel. Veelgi enam, see võib aidata kaasa tulevikus analoogsete 
rikkumiste ärahoidmisele. See on eriti oluline, kuna potentsiaalsete sarnaste rikkumiste 
toimepanek ei ole välistatud – Moskva ekspansionistlik agressiivsus on muret tekitanud ka 
Eestis ja teistes Venemaaga piirnevates riikides. Kui kodanike kaitsmise doktriini puudutavad 
reeglid oleksid kõigile üheseltmõistetavalt selged, oleks teistel riikidel võimalik reageerida 
rikkumistele kiiremini ja ennastkehtestavamalt.  
Magistritöö eesmärgi saavutamiseks uuritakse kõigepealt relvastatud jõu kasutamise erinevaid 
õigustusi. Ülevaate loomisel esimeses peatükis kasutatakse peamiselt tunnustatud 
õigusteadlaste kirjutisi, Rahvusvahelise Kohtu lahendeid ning ÜRO Hartat. Olulisim ülevaate 
juures on see, et rahvusvahelises õiguses on alates Harta jõustumisest riikide õigus kasutada 
jõudu piiratud Harta artikkel 2 lõikega 4. Nagu enamasti, on ka sellel reeglil erandid. Lubatud 
on kasutada jõudu Julgeolekunõukogu mandaadi alusel ning enesekaitseks.  
Teises peatükis keskendutakse kodanike kaitsmisele välismaal. Doktriinist uuritakse nii 
teooria poolelt kui ka märkimisväärsemat riikide praktikat arvesse võttes. Käesoleva 
magistritöö raames pöörab autor tähelepanu ainult ius ad bellum-le. See tähendab, et Krimmi 
kriisi ja teisi juhtumeid ei uurita humanitaarõiguse aspektist, vaid keskendutakse üksnes 
küsimusele, millal on riikidel õigus sekkuda kodanike kaitseks teise riigi territooriumile. 
Teooria analüüsi käigus kasutatakse jällegi peamiselt rahvusvahelise õiguse teadlaste töid 
ning riikide praktikat uurides viidatakse lisaks asjassepuutuvatele ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu ja 
Peaassamblee dokumentidele.  
Kõnealusest peatükist selgub, et õigusteadlaste seas ei valitse üksmeel doktriini lubatavuse 
kohta. Lisaks erineb erimeelsusi ka nende seas, kes põhimõtteliselt doktriini õiguspärasust 
toetavad – nimelt ei jõuta kokkuleppele doktriini õigusliku aluse küsimuses. Leidub autoreid, 
kes on veendunud, et kodanike kaitsmine ei kvalifitseeru jõu kaustamiseks ja seega ei keela 
Harta sellist tegevust.  
Teine, suurem grupp õigusteadlasi on seisukohal, et kodanike kaitsmine välismaal on osa 
enesekaitseõigusest. Ka nende teadlaste hulgas esineb erinevaid arvamusi. Nii väidavad 
mõned, et riikidevaheline praktika enne ÜRO Harda jõustumist tõestab, et kodanike kaitse 
välismaal on tavaõigusliku enesekaitseõiguse osa. Valdav osa teadlasi on aga arvamusel, et 
kuna rünnak kodaniku vastu on võrreldav rünnakuga riigi kui terviku vastu, rakendub sellisel 
juhul Harta artiklist 51 tulenev enesekaitseõigus.  
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Kuigi doktriini lubatavuse ja selle õiguslike aluse seisukohast leidub palju erimeelsusi, on 
enamus autoreid üksmeelel, et juhul kui doktriin on lubatud, kohalduvad sellele piirangud. 
Briti teadlane C. H. M. Waldock on sätestanud enim tuntud kitsendused: eelseisev reaalne oht 
kodanikele välismaal, kohalike võimude võimetus või tahtmatus kodanikke kaitsta ning 
sekkumise proportsionaalsus.  
Riikide praktikat uurides selgub, et tihti kaasneb sekkumisele rahvusvaheline kriitika. 
Seejuures on oluline täheldada, et enamasti on kriitika suunatud viisile, kuidas relvastatud 
jõudu kasutatakse, mitte doktriini kui sellise õiguspärasusele. Oma kodanikke on välismaal 
kaitsnud vaid piiratud arv erinevaid riike, enamus neist lääneriigid. Praktika analüüsist selgub, 
et Egiptus muutis kodanike kaitsmise vajaduse tekkides oma meelt doktriini õiguspärasuse 
kohta. Seega tuleb praktikale hinnangut andes arvestada asjaoluga, et rahvusvahelises õiguses 
omab poliitika sama suurt rolli kui õigus.  
Kodanike kaitse doktriini uurimisele järgneb rahvusvahelises õiguses üsna uudse doktriini – 
mittevõitlejate evakuatsiooni operatisoonide – tutvustus. See on vajalik, kuna mõned 
teadlased on jõudnud järeldusele, et kodanike kaitsmise doktriin on ennast tänaseks 
ammendanud ning selle asemele on tekkinud evakueerimisoperatsioonid. Arvestades et 
nimetatud operatsioonid sagenesid üheksakümnendatel, on teema kohta vaid piiratud kogus 
materjale. Enamusjaolt tugineb autor erinevate riikide sõjaväelistele publikatsioonidele.  
Selgub, et mõned riigid on oma siseriiklikus õiguses uue doktriini omaks võtnud. Nende 
riikide hulka kuulub Ameerika Ühendriikide, Inglismaa, Kanada, Prantsusmaa ja Austraalia 
kõrval ka Eesti. Evakuvatsiooni operatisoonid erinevad kodanike kaitsmise eesmärgil 
sekkumisest mitmeti: näiteks kestavad need tavaliselt lühemat aega, sageli on olemas 
territoriaalriigi (vaikiv) nõusolek ning tihti evakueeritakse ka kolmandate riikide kodanikke.  
Neljandas peatükis keskendutakse Krimmi kriisile ning sellele, kas ja kuidas see kodanike 
kaitse doktriini mõjutanud on. Selleks edastatakse esiteks lühike kokkuvõte Krimmi kriisi 
ajaloolisest taustast. Sellele järgneb ülevaade rahvusvahelise kogukonna reaktsioonist 
Venemaa tegevusele. Lisaks püütakse analüüsida, milline on Venemaa võimalik opinio iuris. 
Peatüki kirjutamisel tuginetakse peamiselt eri ajaleheväljaannete uudistele, Krimmi kriisi 
puudutavatele pressiteadaannetele ning Julgeolekunõukogu dokumentidele.  
Selgub, et rahvusvaheline üldsus on peaaegu üksmeelselt Venemaa sekkumise Krimmis 
hukka mõistnud. Autor oletab, et põhjus, miks Venemaa oma interventsiooni Krimmis lisaks 
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kodanike kaitsmise doktriinile veel mitme erineva õigustusega põhjendas, on see, et ka 
Venemaa ei uskunud oma tegevuse õiguspärasusse.  
Lõpuks edastatakse töö käigus selgunud järeldused ning uuritakse, milline võiks olla lex 
ferenda. Ilmneb, et kodanike kaitse doktriini üksikasjad ei ole veel selgelt välja kujunenud 
ning sellest tulenevalt ei ole võimalik kindlalt väita, et jõu kasutamine sellel eesmärgil on 
õiguspärane. Siiski saab analüüsitud praktikale tuginedes kinnitada, et riigid kasutavad 
relvastatud jõudu kodanike välismaal kaitsmise eesmärgil.  
Arvestades et riikide kriitika on enamasti suunatud sellele, kuidas kodanikke kaitstakse ja 
mitte sellele, et seda tehakse, on õigustatud väita, et doktriini Ahilleuse kand on, et seda on 
kerge kuritarvitada. Näiteks on üsna selge, et Venemaa ei tegutsenud Krimmis heas usus kuna 
tõestust pole leidnud asjaolu, et sealsed Vene kodanikud oleksid tegelikult ohus olnud.  
Selgub, et töö alguses püstitatud hüpotees, et Vene tegevus Krimmis ei ole muutnud kodanike 
kaitse doktriini, leiab kinnitust, kuna Moskva kasutas kodanike kaitsmise vajadust vaid 
ettekäändena. Seega ei loo kõnealune kaasus selgust doktriini piirides.    
Kuigi on vaieldamatult tõsi, et doktriini ärakasutamine kujutab endast reaalset probleemi, ei 
saa eeldada, et riigid oma kodanikke ei abistaks, kui selleks tekib vajadus. Sellises olukorras 
on riik suure poliitilise surve all ning keeld tegutseda oleks tulutu. Töö autor usub, et kui 
kaalukausile panna ühelt poolt humanitaarseid huvid ja teiselt poolt poliitilised huvid, ei kaalu 
võimalikud seaduse rikkumised üle potentsiaalseid riske, mida tooks endaga kaasa 
kiireloomulises olukorras reageerimise keelamine. See on eriti tõsi tänapäeval, mil 
inimõigused omavad järjest rohkem tähtsust, kuna sisuliselt on kodanike kaitsmisel välismaal 
humanitaarne olemus. Pealegi ei ole sellistes pakilistes olukordades tihti hilinemisega 
reaktsioonist enam kasu. See on ka põhjus, miks Harta artiklis 42 toodud sekkumine ei ole 
mõistlik alternatiiv – Julgeolekunõukogu otsused võtavad aega.   
On katehtsusväärne, et ÜRO ükski organ ei ole siiani suutnud problemaatilisele õiguse 
lüngale lahendust leida ning üheseltmõistetavat regulatsiooni välja töötada. Eriti arvestades, et 
sellekohaseid üleskutseid on tulnud ÜRO liikmesriikidelt ning problem on eksisteerinud juba 
Harta vastuvõtmisest alates – nüüdseks juba peaaegu 70 aastat.  
Riikide praktika mittevõitlejate evakuatsiooni operatsioonide läbiviimisel näitab, et uus 
doktriin on hea lahendus kodanike kaitsmise doktriini probleemidele. Analüüsitud 
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evakueerimisoperatsioonid on olnud proportsionaalsed  ja rahvusvaheline ülduses ei ole neid 
kritiseerinud.  
Siiski leiab käesoleva töö autor, et status quo ei ole optimaalne lahendus. On selge, et vaja on 
selget, ühtset ja üheseltmõistetavat regulatsiooni. See aitaks vältida olukorda, kus riigid 
mittevõitlejate evakuatsiooni operatsioone ekslikult valel eesmärgil või viisil läbi viivad, või 
lausa kuritarvitavad, nagu seda on tehtud kodanike kaitsmise doktriiniga. Lisaks aitab selge 
arusaam doktriini piiridest vajadusel tuvastada rikkumised ja vastavalt edasi käituda. Isegi kui 
doktriini käsitleva reeglistiku väljatöötamisel selgub, et evakueerimisoperatsioonide 
läbiviimine ei ole õiguspärane, looks selline lahendus kauaoodatud õiguskindlust.  
Mittevõitlejate evakuatsiooni operatisoonide teemal on mõned õigusteadlased juba kirjutanud, 
kuid nende seisukohad ei ole õiguslikult siduvad. On arusaadav, et Julgeolekunõukogus 
otsusele jõudmine on keeruline, kuna selles on esindatud viis vetoõigusega alalist liiget, kes 
tihti esindavad vastandlikke arusaamasid rahvusvahelisest õigusest. Siiski võib eeldada, et 
Peaassamblee Kuues Peakommitee, kelle ülesandeks on tegeleda õigusküsimustega, on 
võimeline regulatsiooni välja töötama. Autor jääb samuti lootma, et kui Rahvusvahelisel 
Kohtul esineb jälle võimalus problemaatikat lahata, nagu 1980 aastal Teherani kaasuse puhul, 
ei jäeta võimalust kasutamata.  
Uut regulatsiooni välja töötades on võimalik pöörata tähelepanu probleemidele, mis Krimmi 
kriisi valguses ilmsiks on tulnud. Näiteks tuleks arvestada problemaatikat seoses rohkete 
passide väjastamisega teise riigi piirkonnas, kus hiljem kodanikke kaitstakse.  
Lõpetuseks esitab autor oma ettepanekud, mida tuleks uue regulatsiooni väljatöötamisel 
arvestada. Esiteks, vajalikud on Waldocki kriteeriumid või mõned muud analoogsed 
piirangud. Teiseks, päästeoperatsioone tuleks läbi viia vaid inimeste aitamiseks. See tähendab, 
et kodanike või vara evakueerimiseks kõnealune doktriin ei sobi. Samas tuleks võimaldada 
operatsiooni käigus vajadusel ka kolmandate riikide kodanike päästmine. Oht, mis loob aluse  
evakueerimisoperatsiooni läbiviimiseks, võib olla nii looduslik kui inimese poolt põhjustatud, 
näiteks (kodu)sõjad ja rahutused.   
Olukorras, kus territoriaalriigi valitsus on võimul ning (vaikiva) nõusoleku andmine võimalik, 
tuleks seda eelistada loata riiki sisenemisele. Koostöö kohalike võimudega tagab ka 
operatsiooni proportsionaalsuse. Siiski, nõusolek ei tohiks olla eeltingimus, eriti kui 
operatsioon viiakse läbi ebakindlas või ähvardavas keskkonnas, kus kohalik valitsus on 
kaotanud võimu või pole kas võimeline või ei taha kodanikke kaitsta.  
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